East Tennessee State University

Digital Commons @ East
Tennessee State University
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Student Works

8-2012

The Role of Inflation in Soviet History: Prices,
Living Standards, and Political Change
Steven M. Efremov
East Tennessee State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd
Part of the Economic History Commons
Recommended Citation
Efremov, Steven M., "The Role of Inflation in Soviet History: Prices, Living Standards, and Political Change" (2012). Electronic Theses
and Dissertations. Paper 1474. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/1474

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State
University. For more information, please contact digilib@etsu.edu.

The Role of Inflation in Soviet History:
Prices, Living Standards, and Political Change
______________________

A thesis
presented to
the faculty of the Department of History
East Tennessee State University

In partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree
Masters of Arts in History

______________________

by
Steven M. Efremov
August 2012

______________________

Dr. Henry Antkiewicz, Chair
Dr. Stephen G. Fritz
Dr. Gary Shelley
Keywords: Russia, Soviet Union, Hyperinflation, Living Standards, Shortages

ABSTRACT
The Role of Inflation in Soviet History:
Prices, Living Standards, and Political Change
by
Steven M. Efremov

This thesis discusses the interaction between inflation, living standards, and political change in
Soviet/Russian history. It traces the establishment and evolution of the Soviet monetary system,
inflationary episodes, and their consequences.
The goal of this study is to show how inflation affects the lives of ordinary people and how it has
contributed to larger changes in Soviet history. Sources include economic statistics and analysis
from articles and monographs, as well as first-hand accounts from interviews and newspapers.
The results show that inflation was a factor in both the rise and the fall of the Soviet Union.
Russia‟s first hyperinflation (1917-1923) nearly destroyed the economy, and the Bolsheviks were
forced to stabilize prices. The Soviet system of price controls prevented inflation, but it also
created persistent shortages of food and consumer goods. Mikhail Gorbachev tried to alleviate
these problems, but his efforts resulted instead in Russia‟s second hyperinflation (1992-1993).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Price changes, or the lack thereof, were an important factor in determining living
standards and influencing politics throughout the history of the Soviet Union and 20 th century
Russia. In fact, the Soviet Union was both founded and dissolved in the midst of high inflation.
The Bolsheviks took over after high food prices helped bring down the previous governments.
However, their initial policies led to Russia‟s first hyperinflation, widespread suffering, and
domestic unrest, so they had to stabilize the ruble and the economy in order to remain in power.
After Stalin took charge, the Soviet economy struggled with inflation for two decades, until a
currency reform in 1947 finally established a stable monetary system based on fixed prices.
Although price controls prevented inflation, they also created persistent shortages of food and
consumer goods, which were the most common complaints about the economy by Soviet
citizens. Finally, Gorbachev‟s efforts to save the Soviet economy from shortages and stagnation
resulted instead in another hyperinflation and the Union‟s collapse. The inflation and chaos of
the early 1990s has made Russians skeptical of democracy and free markets, and voters have
repeatedly chosen stability at the expense of political and economic freedom.
Inflation first started in the Russian Empire during the First World War and led to higher
food prices in the cities, which were major factor in creating urban discontent and bringing down
both the imperial and provisional governments. However, when the Bolsheviks took over, they
made living conditions even worse by trying to create a moneyless economy. This attempt,
known as war communism, created hyperinflation, a major famine, shortages of goods, and
rebellions by peasants and sailors. The Bolsheviks were forced to establish a stable currency and
8

allow some market activity in order to keep from being overthrown like the two governments
before them. They managed to stabilize the ruble by balancing their budget and backing the
currency with gold. The economy made an astounding recovery in the 1920s under the New
Economic Policy, but industrial prices rose much faster than agricultural prices on the open
market. The Bolshevik leaders responded by crowding out private merchants and re-imposing
price controls. They also continued to purchase grain from the peasants at artificially low rates,
which made them reluctant to sell. These factors inspired the decision to proceed with full-scale
state industrialization and collectivization.
During the Stalin years, the Russian economy had different types of stores with varying
degrees of price controls and inflation. Strict price controls were in place in most state stores and
co-operatives, while others were allowed to sell at higher regulated rates. While these stores had
low prices, they also had shortages and a poor selection of products. In contrast, collective farm
markets were completely free to set their prices according to market forces, but their prices were
usually much higher. During the Second World War, the government started running budget
deficits and printing too much money again, leading to even higher inflation. State stores and
co-operatives remained under price control and had relatively moderate inflation, but the
collective farm markets had price increases that bordered on hyperinflation. Inflation began to
decline in 1944, after the Soviet government balanced its budget, and was eliminated completely
after a currency reform in 1947.
The peculiar monetary system of the Soviet Union managed to avoid open inflation for
most of the post-Stalin era, but that does not mean inflationary pressures did not exist before
Gorbachev‟s time. Consumer prices remained stable for many decades because they were fixed
and subsidized by political authorities and did not reflect supply and demand. Yet despite their
9

best efforts, the authorities could not quash the effects of market forces completely. While retail
prices remained virtually unchanged, workers‟ wages continued to climb over the years. This
created what is known as repressed inflation, which can be defined as rising excess demand that
leads to excess liquid assets in the hands of the population instead of higher prices. 1 As a result,
consumers constantly faced shortages, because production was responsive only to government
plans, and growing demand did not lead to higher supply.
The system of price controls had deleterious effects both for Soviet consumers and for the
economy as a whole. Decades of neglect left Soviet citizens with much lower incomes and
living standards than people had in the West. Shortages of most foods led to lower quality diets,
and many consumer products that were routines available in the West, such as telephones, cars,
and modern washing machines were amazingly rare in the Soviet Union. Living conditions were
less comfortable in many ways, with less housing space per person, no central heating, no air
conditioning, and often no sewer connections or hot water. When consumers could not find
anything they wanted to buy, many chose to save a portion of their income every year. This
effect was cumulative over the years, as unsatisfied demand from each year was carried over to
the next and the population‟s savings continued to grow. By 1985, the Soviet economy had
amassed a large monetary overhang, as the money supply had grown to become many times
larger than what was needed for regular circulation. While these problems had been building
prior to 1985, the economic situation rapidly deteriorated during the Gorbachev years.
The last Soviet leader knew that the economy needed to be reformed, but his efforts only
aggravated its existing problems. Workers‟ wages went up more than ever, but the supply of
consumer goods remained too low, and prices remained fixed. Government budget deficits grew
to unsustainable levels and had to be financed by simply printing more money to cover the
10

shortfalls. These new monetary emissions further contributed to the existing overhang, and the
money supply became dangerously excessive. In late 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed without
solving the economic problems it had created and left its successor states to deal with the
aftermath. When Russia and the other newly independent republics finally freed most prices
from controls in 1992, inflation for the year reached quadruple digits. The economic and social
effects were devastating. Production broke down and shortages initially worsened, making food
and other basic necessities even more difficult to find. People‟s savings, which they had often
been building for years, were wiped out. Russia‟s GDP dropped by at least one-third in four
years, and real incomes dropped for all but the wealthiest segment of society. The hyperinflation
of the 1990s has discredited free markets and democracy in the eyes of many Russians and led to
them to desire stability at all costs, even if it is brought by an authoritarian leader. 2

1

D. M. Nuti, “Hidden and Repressed Inflation in Soviet-type Economies: Definitions, Measurements, and
Stabilisation,” Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 1, (1986): 46.
2
Stefan Hedlund and Niclas Sundström, “The Russian Economy after Systemic Change,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.
48, No. 6 (Sep., 1996): 889, 893, http://www.jstor.org/stable/152632 (accessed on November 2, 2010); Mark
Harrison, “Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy,” The Economic History
Review, New Series, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug. 2002): 398, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3091673 (accessed on
November 11, 2010).
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CHAPTER 2
RUSSIA‟S FIRST HYPERINFLATION

Like many other countries, Russia and the Soviet Union suffered from hyperinflation
following the First World War. In fact, most of Central and Eastern Europe was engulfed in
hyperinflation between 1919 and 1924, including Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Poland, so
Russia was hardly unique in that regard. The causes of these inflations are easily identifiable and
were largely due to the aftermath of The Great War and subsequent economic policies. With few
exceptions, all of the countries were facing the consequences of excessive wartime spending,
large government budget deficits, physical destruction, output collapse, territorial and population
loss. As a result of the economic and budgetary problems, the governments of these countries
resorted to issuing ever-increasing amounts of unbacked paper money to finance their
expenditures. Invariably, these policies caused hyperinflation and economic chaos. Russia‟s case
followed all of these patterns except for one major difference. In 1919, the Bolsheviks started
trying to intentionally abolish money and establish a centrally planned economy based on in-kind
distribution. It was this specific decision, based on their ideology, that created hyperinflation
and almost completely destroyed the Russian economy. Nevertheless, the ruble was stabilized
virtually the same way as all the other currencies that were devalued around the same time. 1 Due
to a collapse in output and growing unrest, the Bolsheviks were forced to admit that allocating
resources without the use of money was impossible, so they balanced their budget, issued a goldbacked ruble, and partially legalized private trade.
Background
The background to Russia‟s first hyperinflation shared many similarities with the
12

contemporary ones of its neighbors. Prior to the war, the ruble had 98 percent gold backing and
was one of the most stable currencies in the world. The Russian economy was growing rapidly
and there were signs that the capitalist reforms of Witte and Stolypin* had put Russia on track to
eventually become one of the wealthiest countries of Europe. Certainly, this is not to say that
most Russians were prosperous or even content, but the economy was at least heading in the
right direction. The First World War reversed this trend and inaugurated a decade of high
inflation and general economic failure. Like the other belligerents, the Russian Empire had to
shift all available resources to the war effort, to the detriment of other economic activity. Russia
ended up spending a similar amount of money on the war as France and the United States, but
Russia‟s government had much greater difficulty financing the expenditures than the Western
powers. The imperial government relied heavily on foreign borrowing to cover its budget
deficits, which limited the amount of money it needed to print to some degree. However, per
capita income for Russia‟s citizens was three to five times lower than England, Germany, or
France, which made it difficult for the Russian state to extract revenue from domestic sources.
All of the war‟s participants went off of the gold standard and began issuing unbacked paper
currency, but the lack of revenue led the Russian state to print money faster than the other major
powers.2
The imperial government‟s wartime policies resulted in economic chaos and its own
political downfall. By the start of 1917, the amount of rubles in circulation had increased four to
six times, depending on the source. In comparison, the volume of banknotes increased by 100
percent in France, 200 percent in Germany, and during the course of the whole war, while Great

*

Sergei Witte was Imperial Russia’s Finance Minister from 1892 to 1905. Witte is known for leading construction
of the Trans-Siberian Railway and Russia’s industrialization. Pyotr Stolypin was the Russian Prime Minister from
1906 to 1911. Stolypin undertook an agrarian reform with the goal of privatizing peasant communal land.
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Britain money supply actually remained stable. Not surprisingly, this created greater inflation in
Russia than in the other three countries. The war also created food shortages by breaking down
transportation networks and sending farm workers to the front. The Russian people began to feel
the effects of inflation and shortages in the fall of 1915. The result was essentially a
redistribution of wealth from the urban population to the rural. While city dwellers struggled to
find and afford food, peasants made unprecedented profits from selling their produce and
livestock. As the war continued, the food-producing regions of the south had increasing
difficulty shipping their food to the north, and shortages became especially severe in Petrograd.
In late February of 1917, hundreds of thousands of workers (mostly women) filled the streets to
protest food shortages, the war, and the autocracy. Soldiers refused to fire on the crowds and
soon joined them in open rebellion, marking the end of the Tsar Nicholas II‟s authority.
Although it would be a stretch to say economic reasons alone brought down the autocracy, they
clearly played a role. After years of maintaining a stable currency, the Russian Empire collapsed
in the midst of high inflation and food shortages, a situation that was later mirrored by the
demise of the Soviet Union. The obvious difference was that Imperial Russia‟s economic and
political demise was also brought about by the loss of about 1.7 million men and widespread
destruction from the war.3
The imperial government‟s devaluation of the ruble was continued by the succeeding
revolutionary governments. Despite the population‟s great discontent with the war, rising prices,
and the inadequate food supply, the Provisional Government chose to continue the war effort.
This decision ensured that the economy‟s problems would continue and soon brought down this
new government as well. The Provisional Government issued a new ruble, known as the
“Kerenki” after its leader Alexander Kerensky, but this did nothing to curb inflation. Meanwhile,
14

Kerensky‟s government continued to rack up huge budget deficits from the war effort. By one
estimate, military expenditures for 1917 were almost exactly equivalent to the year‟s budget
deficit.† The Provisional Government financed its deficit by printing nine billion additional
rubles, which almost doubled the money supply from the time they took power to the end of their
tenure. Serious shortages of food, clothes, shoes, and other manufactured goods continued due
to the war‟s disruptions on manufacturing, transportation, and trade. Neither the Provisional
Government nor the parallel Soviets (workers‟ councils) were able alleviate the supply problems,
and the Russian people continued to suffer. Given this situation, it is unsurprising that Lenin‟s
slogan of “Peace, Land, and Bread” was highly appealing to the Russian masses. 4
Of course, World War I was only the first of successive catastrophes that befell Russia,
and it was soon overshadowed by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War. This was true on
many fronts, including the monetary situation. The Civil War and the Bolshevik economic
policy known as War Communism led to the collapse of the ruble and even greater economic
deprivation than the Russians had experienced during the First World War. As soon as they took
power, the Bolsheviks set out to transform Russian society according to textbook socialist
principles. The policies that lasted from 1918 to 1921 became known as “War Communism.”
The goal of War Communism was for the state to take complete control of the nation‟s economy
and reorganize it in a more “rational” manner that would benefit the proletariat. Lenin‟s first
priority was to nationalize the banks, which he believed held all the power under capitalism.
Accordingly, by the end of the first winter, the Bolsheviks nationalized all of Russia‟s banks and
placed them under the control of the State Bank, which they renamed the People‟s Bank. The
bank continued to issue billions of unbacked Kerenki rubles in 1918, but the money supply
†

Although exact figures for such a chaotic year may be unreliable, Pethybridge cites an estimate that puts the
deficit for 1917 at 22,568 million rubles (same as Katzenellenbaum) and military expenditures at 22,561 million
rubles.
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actually grew at a slower rate than in had in the previous year. 5
Table 1. Amount of Paper Currency
in Circulation, 1914-1924
Amount (in
millions of rubles)
1,630
2,947
5,617
9,097
9,950
18,917
27,300
60,800
225,014
1,168,600
17,543,900
1,994,500,000
178,510,000,000

Date
July 1, 1914
Jan. 1, 1915
Jan. 1, 1916
Jan. 1, 1917
Mar. 1, 1917
Oct. 23, 1917
Jan. 1, 1918
Jan. 1, 1919
Jan. 1, 1920
Jan. 1, 1921
Jan. 1, 1922
Jan. 1, 1923
Jan. 1, 1924

Source: Katzenellenbaum, 56-58.

Hyperinflation
The floodgates to hyperinflation opened in May of 1919 when the Bolsheviks gave the
People‟s Bank permission to print as much money as it deemed necessary for the economy. The
bank started literally printing money as quickly as it could, and the supply of paper money began
to grow at an exponential rate. Starting in 1919, the Bolsheviks also began issuing their own
paper currencies, which they called sovznaki, or Soviet tokens, in a semantic attempt to deny that
they could not dispense with the use of money. In fact, they virtually did destroy the ruble, as all
of the revolutionary currencies became worthless and Imperial rubles were hoarded out of
circulation. Peasants had to resort to bartering or using bread and salt as currency, while the
government had to pay workers in kind by rationing out supplies. Although the Bolsheviks
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realized by 1921 that they could not effectively dispense with money and needed to establish a
stable currency, hyperinflation did not reach its apex until 1923. The following chart shows the
enormous growth rates of prices and the money supply. 6
Table 2. Yearly Money Emissions and Price Increases, 1913-1923

Year
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
Oct., 1923

Amount of New
Paper Currency
Issued (in
Millions)
1,317
2,670
3,480
16,403
33,500
164,200
943,600
16,375,300
1,976,900,000
176,505,500,000
-

Percentage
Increase in
Money
Supply
77.1%
90.6
61.2
180.3
119.2
302.5
419.3
1402.0
11,268.2
8,849.6
-

Price Index
for Moscow*

Price Index
for Whole of
Russia

1.00
1.01
1.30
1.56
3.15
27.80
278
4,180
24,600
244,000
20,750,000
638,000,000

1.00
1.01
1.30
1.55
3.00
23.50
164
2,420
16,800
288,000
21,015,000
648,230,000

Percentage
Increase in
Prices for
Russia
28.7%
20.0
93.5
683.3
597.5
1,375.6
594.2
1,614.3
7,196.9
-

*Price indexes show where prices stood on January 1 of the given year, except for the last numbers available from
October 1st . The other columns include changes that occurred over the course of each entire year.

Source: Katzenellenbaum, 59, 74-75.

As with the contemporary hyperinflations of Central Europe, one factor in the Russian
economy‟s decline was territorial loss. The Bolsheviks ended the war with the Central Powers
by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of 1918, but this came at a cost of several
modern countries‟ worth of territory. The Germans did not have the manpower to hold the
territory and were forced to pull out by the end of the year, but other hostile armies soon filled
the vacuum. As Russia exited the Great War, the Civil War between the Bolsheviks and their
opponents spread across the country. Various opposing armies marched across former Russian
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territory, destroying railways, roads, and materials in the process. The Bolshevik center lost
several important agricultural and industrial regions to the White Armies in late 1918 and did not
reestablish control until 1920. The loss of Ukraine‟s wheat and oil fields was particularly
damaging to the already crippled Russian economy, as well as those of the North Caucasus.
Other losses included the textiles of Turkestan and the Baltics, the Donets coal basin, and most
of Russia‟s iron and steel factories. The Bolsheviks defeated the White Armies by late 1920 and
fully routed the anarchist Black Army the following year. The invasion of Poland in 1920 ended
in defeat for the Red Army, and Russia concluded the Treaty of Riga with Poland in March
1921. In this treaty, Ukraine and Belarus were divided up with Poland, and Russia regained
control of the eastern halves of these lands. Poland and the Baltic States remained independent
states and were not reconquered by Russia until the Second World War. 7
There is no hyperinflation on record that is not correlated with large government budget
deficits, and Russia‟s first was no different. The Imperial government ran a deficit of 39 percent
in the first year of the war and around 75 percent the next two years. However, it was still able
to cover a good portion of these deficits with loans, and less than one-third of the deficits of 1915
and 1916 was covered by issuing paper money. In 1917, the deficit reached 81.7 percent and the
percentage covered by note issue went up significantly to 73 percent. As shown earlier, the
Provisional government greatly increased the rate of currency issue to cover its budget shortfalls.
When the Bolsheviks took over, their deficits grew even larger than those of the previous
governments, and they started covering them entirely via the printing press. Lenin‟s views on
state fiscal matters were rather traditional, and he theoretically favored maintaining balanced
budgets. However, his subordinates in charge of finance did not share his concerns, and
Bolshevik fiscal policies made balancing the budget or controlling inflatio n impossible. In
18

February 1918, they repudiated all state debts, and afterwards, foreign governments and private
lenders refused to offer loans to the new Russian state. They attempted to cover their
expenditures through income and property taxes, but these revenues were vastly inadequate.
There were some efforts to keep spending under control in early 1918, but such inclinations gave
way to unlimited money printing by 1919. 8
Accurate budgetary figures for this period are difficult to obtain because the
Commissariat of Finance did not seem to take its job very seriously. In May 1918, the
department could only make the vaguest guess of how much the government was spending and
taking in, and their best estimate for expenditures was a figure with a range of 5 billion rubles.
In a party meeting during 1919, the Commissar of Finance, Nikolai Krestinskii, implied that his
job had no reason to exist, stating “Finance should not exist in a socialistic community and I
must, therefore, apologize for speaking on the subject.” There were also practical difficulties to
calculating the budget. Because the ruble was depreciating so rapidly and irregularly each
month, planning yearly budgets ahead of time was impossible. Instead, the Commissariat of
Finance published biannual budgets retroactively. According to Katzenellenbaum‟s older
estimates, the deficit percentage of expenditures in 1918 was actually lower than it had been
during the previous three years, and the percentages of 1919-1921 were slightly higher than they
had been during the Great War years. Newer estimates from R. W. Davies (cited by Malle) are
more pessimistic. According to these figures, revenues as a percentage of expenditure never
reached higher than 22 percent from the 1918 to 1920, and the true percentage for most of the
period may have been in the single digits. 9
It appears that most of the spending went towards subsidizing the newly nationalized
industries and paying their workers, as well as fighting the Civil War. After March 1919, state
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enterprises received all of their funding for production and wages directly from the budget.
Their inputs were covered via the printing press and direct in kind transfers. The Bolsheviks
claimed that they had to continue to print money in order to pay peasants for their food, but in
fact urban workers and bureaucrats received far more. From 1918 to 1920, farmers received a
total of 20 billion rubles, compared to a vastly larger total of 400 billion rubles in wage payments
over the same period. Ironically, one of the enterprises employing the most workers was the
mint, with 17,361 employees by October 1921. Defense spending was intended to be second to
the economic enterprises according to the plan for 1919 but ended up costing more than anything
else. After 1920, the Civil War started to wind down and defense spending became less
important. Yet even when the Civil War ended, the Bolshevik government continued to run
enormous deficits due to the waste and inefficiency of War Communism. 10
Table 3. Budgetary Figures, 1914-1921
(In Millions of Rubles)
Year
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921

Revenue

Expenditure

Deficit

2,961
3,001
4,345
5,039
15,580
48,959
159,604
4,139,900

4,859
11,562
18,101
27,607
46,706
215,402
1,215,159
26,076,816

1,898
8,561
13,756
22,568
31,126
166,443
1,055,555
21,936,916

Percent Deficit
on Total
Expenditure
39.1
74.0
76.0
81.7
66.6
77.3
86.9
84.1

Note Issue
1,283
2,670
3,480
16,403
33,500
164,200
943,600
16,375,300

Source: Katzenellenbaum, 69.

The overall result of War Communism and Civil War was a severe collapse in economic
output and widespread suffering for most of the population. Gross industrial output fell to less
than one-third of 1913 levels by 1921. Out of the total number, output from large-scale industry
20

fell to 21 percent of its pre-war level, and production of many specific items, such as steel,
bricks, and sugar, practically ceased. As a result of such anemic economic performance, the
living standard of workers, whom the revolution was supposed to benefit, fell to a third of the
prewar level. Wages became meaningless as hyperinflation destroyed the ruble, and workers had
to rely on meager rations and free services to sustain themselves. The loss of territories that
contained important industries and fertile soil were a factor in the economic collapse, but the
policies of War Communism also clearly played a role. Lenin ordered the nationalization of all
Russian industries in June of 1918, and by the end of 1920, this was virtually accomplished.11
Table 4. Output Comparison, 1913 and 1921

Gross output of all industry (index)
Large Scale industry (index)
Coal (million tons)
Oil (million tons)
Electricity (billion kilowatts)
Pig iron (million tons)
Steel (million tons)
Bricks (millions)
Sugar (million tons)
Railway tonnage carried (millions)
Agricultural production (index)
Exports (in 1913 rubles)
Imports (in 1913 rubles)

1913 1921
100
31
100
21
29
9
9.2
3.8
2039 520
4.2
0.1
4.3
0.2
2.1
0.01
1.3
0.05
132.4 39.4
100
60
1374 208
1520
20

Note: Some of the figures above do not refer to strictly comparable territory.
Source: Nove, 68.

Placing industry under direct state control was supposed to raise productivity and output
by removing the alleged inefficiencies of capitalism, but the effect was the exact opposite. As
nationalization progressed, output, productivity, and the number of employed industrial workers
continued to plummet, while illegal private trade on the black market conversely grew. From
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various estimates, it appears that about two-thirds of the food consumed in Russian cities during
the period of War Communism came from the black market. The Bolsheviks made efforts to
stop this type of private trade, but there were limits to their power and perhaps even their
willingness to use indiscriminate violence. In September 1918, the authorities gave in and
started allowing peasants to bring in up to one and a half puds (54 pounds) of grain and sell it
freely. Nevertheless, daily caloric intake for Russian workers dropped by 30 percent in 1919
from the 1908-1916 average, from 3,820 calories to 2,680. 12
Russia‟s agriculture and peasantry were hurt just as badly by War Communism as
industry and the urban population. Whereas peasants had benefitted from the moderate inflation
of the First World War by selling their products for higher prices, they now suffered from the
Bolshevik hyperinflation. Although a burgeoning black market existed for agricultural products,
illicit trade was always dangerous and official government prices always lagged far beyond
inflation. The peasants also had the value of savings erased by hyperinflation, a process that was
repeated much later when the Soviet Union collapsed. They had accumulated an estimated total
of 5 billion rubles in bank savings by the time of the October Revolution, as well as a possible 78 billion hidden under mattresses and buried. Although the Bolsheviks did not confiscate small
savings accounts when they nationalized banks, they still managed to expropriate their value
through the inflation tax. In other words, the Soviet state gained purchasing power by printing
money to cover its budget deficits, while the resulting inflation diminished the purchasing power
of peasant savings.13
However, the most unpopular policy for the peasants was the irregular seizing of farm
products known as prodrazverstka. The Bolsheviks resorted to this policy because peasants
refused to sell their food at official state prices in rapidly depreciating currency. The coercive
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requisitioning of foodstuffs was greatly resented by the peasants and gave them far less incentive
to produce a surplus. This policy, combined with a severe drought, led to the first great Soviet
famine. The grain harvest of 1920 was only 54 percent of the average from 1909 to 1913 and the
harvest of the following year fell to 43 percent of the pre-war levels. Despite both domestic
relief efforts and those of Hoover‟s American Relief Administration, an estimated 5 million
people were killed by the famine of 1921. Violence, chaos, hunger, and misery pervaded Russia
and kept getting worse. In 1920, peasant rebellions spread across Russia as fear of harsher
requisitions and starvation grew. That fall, the Bolsheviks could only spare 3,000 Red Army
soldiers to deal with several thousand revolting partisans in the Tambov region. By February of
1921, Lenin became worried enough about losing the countryside that he began to consider
abandoning food requisitions. Finally, the sailors rebellion at Kronstadt the following month
convinced the Bolsheviks that they needed to change economic policy or their government
would collapse in the midst of inflation and starvation like the two before them. 14
Discussion
The interesting question is whether the Bolsheviks intentionally created the
hyperinflation due to their Marxist ideology, which called for the abolition of money, or simply
because printing money was their only available source of finance, as in the case of the other
great inflations of the 1920s. Both perspectives have been argued by different authors. Silvana
Malle, an economist, suggests that the first Russian hyperinflation was a fairly typical one, in
which the government used the printing press to finance its expenditures because it was not able
to do so any other way. Several prominent historians of Soviet Russia instead emphasize the role
of the Bolshevik ideology and the specific policy choices to which it led. Richard Pipes directly
counters views such as Malle‟s and argues that hyperinflation was the result of deliberate policy
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measures inspired by Marxist ideology, rather than “responses to desperate needs.”‡ Alec Nove
leans towards the perspective of Pipes but points out that circumstances played a role, as well as
ideology. Nove cites a passage from R. W. Davies which explains that the Bolsheviks only
moved forward with trying to establish a moneyless economy “when it proved impossible to
stabilize the currency” and “the abolition of money [seemed] inevitable.” Although there is
merit to both of these types of views, the more balanced approach of Nove and Davies seems to
make the most sense.15
The circumstances and economic mechanisms behind Russia‟s first hyperinflation did
mirror those of its neighbors in many ways. As we have seen, the devaluation of the ruble began
not after the Bolshevik Revolution, but during the First World War. The Imperial government‟s
military expenditures led to large budget deficits, which it financed by issuing unbacked paper
currency after going off of the gold standard. This process was only different from what
happened in the other war economies by nature of degree. The Tsar abdicated in the midst of a
failing war effort, economic decline, and political unrest. After the first revolution, the
Provisional Government took charge of a country in turmoil and only made the situation worse
by running bigger deficits and printing more money even faster. After the second revolution, the
Bolsheviks did the same. This again was scarcely different from what happened in Austria,
Hungary, Germany, and Poland. The consequences of war, destruction, territorial loss, political
turmoil, and bad economic policy were enough to cause hyperinflation in all of these countries.
Russia suffered from these problems even more than the others and made the typical mistake of
financing government budget deficits by printing unbacked paper currency. Thus, it could be
said that Russia‟s first hyperinflation was a fairly typical one caused by predictable economic
‡

Specifically, Pipes counters Marxist historian E. H. Carr, who somewhat ironically holds the same view on this
topic as the pro-market economist Silvana Malle.
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factors. However, each instance of hyperinflation is also attached to unique historical
circumstances and political choices made by the relevant authorities.16
When the Bolsheviks took over, they had to choose whether to save the existing capitalist
monetary system in some form or try to create a socialist moneyless system of distribution.
According to Marx, money was a source of alienation that would become unnecessary in a
socialist economy. The Bolsheviks were also influenced by the German Marxist Rudolf
Hilderding, who had argued that it was banks that held all the power in advanced capitalist
economies. Thus, the Bolsheviks believed that nationalizing banks should be the top priority and
socialist Russia would, at some point, no longer have a use for money. However, Lenin and
Trotsky apparently realized that Russia did not have an advanced capitalist economy, and they
initially favored keeping the capitalist system under state supervision as an intermediary step in
the transition to socialism. The Left Communists, led by Bukharin and Obolenskii (known as
Osinskii), refused to accept any compromise with capitalism and instead wanted to immediately
move forward towards a planned economy that kept accounts without using money. 17
The leftist view won out in April 1918 with the decision to move forward with the
program that came to be known as War Communism. However, they knew it would still take
some time to nationalize all of the country‟s private industries and create a socialist economy. In
the meantime, they continued to use traditional methods of public finance, such as taxation,
monetary accounts for state enterprises, and wages for workers. As shown earlier, tax revenue
proved to be inadequate to cover government expenditures, so the Bolsheviks resorted to the
printing press, like the governments before them had done. When the value of the ruble
continued to fall and more of the economy came under state control, the Bolsheviks became
convinced that it would soon be possible to establish a moneyless economy. In March 1919,
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Lenin signed off on a Communist Party program calling for the abolition of money. After this
point, the Bolsheviks stopped even caring about ruble expenditures and began focusing on how
the budget would work without the use of money. 18
It was the attempt to create a moneyless economy that caused inflation to skyrocket far
above the previous levels it had reached. In May 1919, the Bolsheviks made the crucial decision
to allow the People‟s Bank to print as much money as it felt necessary. As a result, the inflation
rate more than doubled, from 598 percent in 1918 to 1,376 percent in 1919, officially turning
high inflation into hyperinflation. The following year, the government tried to use a moneyless
budget by avoiding cash transactions and funding all state expenditures with direct advances.
State enterprises simply delivered materials and rendered services to each other without
payment, while workers and many other citizens received housing, transport, and whatever food
and goods were available were for free. Money was literally becoming worthless in the
Bolshevik economy. By October of 1923, prices had increased by over 648 million times from
what they had been in 1913. Preobrazhensky, one of the other Left Communists, was proud of
the hyperinflation the Bolsheviks had created, and Osinskii refused to admit that moneyless
finance could not work. However, the more moderate Bolsheviks realized by 1921 that such a
policy was simply untenable.

Undoing what they had wrought was another matter. 19

As early as 1919, economist and theoretician Ludwig von Mises argued that rational
economic calculation is impossible without the use of money. § In a market economy, money
serves as the common denominator by which people can calculate the values of a myriad of
§

Mises first presented this argument i n a lecture in 1919, responding to a book by Otto Neurath which argued that
the German war economy proved that central planning without the use of money was in fact possible. Mises then
published an essay based on this argument, titled "Die Wirtschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen" or
“Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth.” Finally, he developed it into a book in 1922, titled Die
Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus or Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis.
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different goods and services. Individuals assign their own subjective values to various
commodities they desire, and all try to obtain ones that bring them more satisfaction in exchange
for those they consider less valuable. Money serves as the medium of exchange to facilitate
these trades by allowing actors to “reduce values to a common unit.” Without the use of money,
people looking to trade their labor or goods would have to find trade partners who both want
what the other has to offer and have what they want in return. For example, a farmer who has a
spare horse and wants a plow would have to find someone who has a spare plow and needs a
horse. In addition, both parties would have to view this as a fair exchange. In mainstream
economics, this is known as the double coincidence of wants problem. Obviously, bartering this
way is very time-consuming and inefficient, and it would be far easier to just sell the horse for
cash and buy a plow. Thus, without money, trade becomes far more difficult are far less of it
occurs. Finally, money can also serve as a store of value or a standard of deferred payment for
paying debts if its value remains relatively stable. This allows people to collect savings to use
for a later date or make purchases and investments on credit. 20
The problem with central planning based on in kind resource allocation, as Mises argues,
is that economic value can only be calculated if capital goods can be exchanged and all factors of
production can be compared using a common unit, i.e. money. Prices and wages serve as signals
to producers how to best allocate capital goods, natural resources, and labor in order to achieve
the most efficient production methods. In a socialist economy without price signals, the
authorities in charge of production have no way to make these calculations. Even if planners
know which goods are needed most urgently, they cannot determine the opportunity costs of
production. If a single political entity controls every industry, the authorities can transfer capital
goods and labor at will, but it is impossible for them to know which moves are necessary.
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Without monetary price signals moving up or down, there is no way to adapt to changing
conditions and adjust previous economic decisions. The inevitable result is that some industries
will end up with too many workers and resources and others will not have enough. An infinite
number of possibilities exist for the allocation of capital goods and labor, and it is impossible for
any person or group to figure out an efficient combination without the use of monetary
calculations. Labor itself cannot serve as the unit of account because the value of different kinds
of labor constantly fluctuates based on the final products each worker can create. 21
Aside from the extenuating circumstances of war and territorial loss, the Bolshevik
attempt to establish a moneyless economy explains why output suffered such a severe collapse.
As the value of the ruble collapsed, it became increasingly more difficult for people to calculate
either present or future transactions. However, even if citizens wanted to trade or make
investments, these activities became not only more complicated but illegal. The Bolsheviks
intended to be the only actors controlling economic activity, but the system they created made it
impossible for them to do so. The millions of people they ruled needed food more than anything,
but they also needed housing, transportation, clothes, and numerous other goods. As shown
earlier, peasants had no incentive to produce a surplus to would either be exchanged for a
worthless sum of cash or simply taken away. The peasants might have been willing to trade their
food for industrials goods, but the government had virtually none to give them.
The Bolsheviks were able nationalize virtually all of Russia‟s industry, but industrial
output suffered decline even worse than the agricultural sector. By late 1919, the Supreme
Council of the National Economy (VSNKh or Vesenkha) controlled thousands of enterprises
with over a million workers. Bukharin, the leader of the Left Communists, conceived of VSNKh
as a single firm that controlled all of these constituent parts, distributed their inputs, and told
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them which goods to produce, how many, and in what priority. All of these enterprises were
supposed to exchange their inputs and output through VSNKh without the use of money as a unit
of account. As Mises predicted, the enterprises were baffled as to how to even do this, and the
attempt ended in complete failure. Some of the Bolshevik theoreticians discussed ways to
establish “labor units” as the common denominator, but they were unable to implement any of
these ideas before War Communism ended. By 1921, the Bolshevik leaders realized that it was
simply impossible for them to administrate thousands of different enterprises without the use of
money. In March, they decided that they needed to change their economic policy and try to
stabilize the currency after all.22
Stabilization
The failure of War Communism and a moneyless economic system became so obvious
that the Bolsheviks were forced to temporarily abandon their attempts to enact Marxist-Leninist
principles and allow some market activity. The New Economic Policy (NEP), which began in
1921, established a mixed economy, as a compromise between communism and capitalism.
Since NEP made private trade legal again, it required a stable currency in order to work.
However, achieving this was easier said than done, and inflation only worsened after the
Bolsheviks released price controls. Desperately seeking a stable unit of account, they calculated
the 1922 budget in terms of pre-war rubles. Preobrazhensky remarked that this type of currency
“was based on the memory of what prices had been 1913.” Obviously, this was not a solid
enough backing to guarantee the ruble‟s value. As long as the printing press rapidly churned out
rubles, inflation continued.23
Much like the preceding hyperinflation, the stabilization that followed came in an
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orthodox, economically predictable fashion. In July 1922, the Bolsheviks decided to completely
change their fiscal policies. They resolved to balance the budget and issue a new currency,
known as the chervonets, that would be based on the gold standard. The chervonets was issued
in late 1922 and circulated alongside the paper sovznak. The former was in short supply and
highly demanded, while the value of the latter fell to almost nothing. Finally, the chervonets was
established as the only legal currency in February 1924, and sovznaki issued in 1923 were
exchanged at a ratio of 15,000 to one. In order to keep from having to print more money, the
Soviet government balanced its budget in the fiscal year 1923-24 and ran a surplus in 1924-25.
This was accomplished by levying several new types of taxes, as well as collecting interest off of
both voluntary and coerced savings. In addition, the State Bank became independent again, and
a new, more conservative leader was put in charge of the Commissariat of Finance, Grigori
Sokolnikov. As it became clear to the population that the Bolsheviks were serious about their
change in fiscal policy and commitment to a stable currency, velocity** fell drastically and
hyperinflation finally ended.24
The stabilization of the ruble closely follows Thomas Sargent‟s theory of “rational
expectations” and the examples he describes. Sargent argues that firms and workers are rational
to expect high inflation when “the government‟s current and prospective monetary and fiscal
policies warrant those expectations.” While isolated actions to combat inflation are not effective
in changing expectations, a change in policy regime or long-term strategy can convince the
public. Sargent lists common features of how all four of the contemporary Central European
inflations were stopped. All four countries balanced their budgets and established independent

**

Velocity is a measure of the average frequency with which money is spent. High velocity is associated with
hyperinflation because people try to spend money as quickly possible before it loses its value. In Russia, velocity
was 54.7 in 1922, before falli ng to 23.2 in 1923 and 13 in 1924.
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central banks that refused to grant unsecured credit to their governments. This kept the
governments from issuing more debt than they could back with future taxes and from relying on
the central banks for their finances. As soon as the public understood that these changes
occurred, inflation stopped. Indeed, when the Bolsheviks simply counted their budget in pre-war
rubles, this did nothing to stabilize the currency. However, as soon as they balanced the budget,
made the central bank independent, and issued a new gold-backed ruble, hyperinflation
immediately stopped.25
Table 5. The Percentage Rate of Change of the Money Stock,
the Price Level, and Output, 1919-27
Year
Money Stock Prices Total Output Industrial Output Agricultural Output
1919-20
405
978
-10
-9
-10
1920-21
599
869
-12
10
-20
1921-22
16,420
7,590
47
64
39
1922-23
(monetary reform)
18
28
13
1923-24
128
37
3
22
-9
1924-25
89
42
43
41
1925-26
40
11
13
21
6
1926-27
24
-3
1
8
-6
Source: Pickersgill, 1039.

By allowing private trade and creating a stable currency, the New Economic Policy led to
tremendous growth in output. When market activity was first legalized in 1921, the economy
saw an immediate and substantial recovery, despite the ongoing hyperinflation at the time. The
monetary reform of 1922-23 was successful in drastically reducing inflation to 37 percent the
following year, however, output growth also declined to a negligible 3 percent. †† This negative
side-effect can be interpreted in two ways. It can either be seen as support for the view that
reducing inflation also leads to a significant drop in output, or the Soviet economy simply took

††

th

Until 1930, the Soviet fiscal year began in October 1 and ended September 30 .
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some time to recover from hyperinflation. The evidence seems to support the latter
interpretation. The inflation rate reached its peak in October 1923, and the Soviet budget was
first balanced the next fiscal year. The chervonets was only established as the sole legal
currency in February 1924 and took some time to get out to the peasants in the countryside. In
addition, the freedom of contract was further defined in 1924 in a decree that legalized the
leasing of land and allowed farmers to hire laborers. As industry and agriculture adjusted to the
newly stabilized currency and greater tolerance for market activity, NEP hit its peak in 1924-25,
and the fiscal year saw another enormous increase in output. In 1926, Russian industrial and
agricultural output finally caught up to pre-war levels.26
Most of this increase in growth was from the development of the newly legalized private
industry and trade. The government retained control of the “commanding heights” of the
economy and state enterprises produced most wholesale goods, while the private sector was
allowed to take over small-scale industry and compete with official outlets in retail trade. State
industries remained highly inefficient due to excessive overhead costs and low labor
productivity, so their final products ended up being more expensive than those produced by
private industry. Due to their higher prices, state stores and cooperates could not compete with
private traders, known as Nepmen. In the early years of NEP, private trade was responsible for a
vast majority of retail sales across Russia, a total of 78 percent in 1922-23. The following fiscal
year, the proportion of private retail trade fell to 57.7 percent and then to around 42 percent in
the following two years, although the overall volume of private trade continued to increase
though 1925-26. After this point, the Soviet government began to clamp down on private trade
by depriving the Nepmen of manufactured goods, fuel, and raw materials, and by raising taxes to
cut into their profits. The share of private trade declined to 36.9 percent in 1926-27, while the
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overall volume remained stagnant and began to fall drastically after the next year. ‡‡ As private
economic activity ceased to grow, so did the Soviet economy as a whole. 27
Table 6. Private Turnover during and after NEP, 1922-1930
Year
1922-23
1923-24
1924-25
1925-26
1926-27
1928
1929
1930

Total private turnover
Percent of total trade
(million rubles)
2680
78
57.7
3300
42.5
4963
42.3
5063
36.9
3406
22.5
2273
13.6
1043
5.6
Source: Nove, 136; Bandera, 269.

Soviet workers benefitted in many ways from the introduction of private trade and a
stabilized currency. In the first years before inflation stopped, the transition to a money
economy was tough for workers. The free rations and services that they had grown used to were
abolished, and it was difficult for them to live on their tiny wages, which lost their purchasing
power rapidly before 1923. Initially, there was labor unrest and strikes, but conditions soon
improved when the currency and the economy stabilized. The supply of goods grew with the
development of private enterprise, and so did workers‟ wages, which were negotiated relatively
freely during this period. After a low point of only one-third of pre-war levels in 1920-21, wages
almost caught up to 1913 levels in real monthly terms by 1925-26. Working conditions also
improved due to the enactment of labor regulations and benefits. Such laws were passed first by
the Provisional Government and expanded early on by the Bolsheviks, but they meant little
during the chaos of war communism and only became reality under NEP. A law from 1922
‡‡

Alec Nove writes that the overall volume of private trade began to fall in 1926 -27, although his statistics seem to
indicate that the decline in total private turnover did not begin until the following year.
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clarified that work days were limited to eight hours, or even less for heavy labor, and workers
received two weeks of paid holidays per year, as well as pay for sickness or unemployment.28
Despite the economic recovery, unemployment also became a serious problem under
NEP. As enterprises shed the bloated staffs that they had accumulated during war communism,
unemployment grew rapidly. Out of a workforce of 8.5 million, which does not include
peasants, the number of unemployed during NEP ranged from about 1 to 1.5 million. While the
rise of unemployment is usually blamed on the rise of market forces, this interpretation does not
seem entirely accurate. It is true that the government started encouraging enterprises to make
profits and cut out excess labor, rather than paying too many workers and putting out
unaffordable products. At the beginning of NEP, there were simply not enough productive jobs
available for all of Russia‟s urban laborers. Many industries had been destroyed by a decade of
war and unsound economic policy, and they needed time to recover. Indeed, the unemployment
rate rose rapidly in 1923, while the Bolsheviks were still struggling to defeat hyperinf lation, and
reached 14.6 percent in January 1924, before the chervonets was established as the sole legal
tender. When private trade hit its peak in 1925, the rate fell to 11.1 percent. Afterwards, the
government began to clamp down on the Nepmen, and unemployment rose to 18.8 percent by
the end of the decade. In addition, labor regulations were partly responsible for the high
unemployment, especially among young people, who were limited to working six-hours per day
and enjoyed other legal privileges which made employers not want to hire them. 29
Peasant conditions improved even more significantly under NEP. One of the main
inspirations for abandonment of war communism in the first place was the spread of peasant
rebellions due to the unpopular policy of food requisitions. The was replaced by a fixed tax in
kind, or prodnalog, in 1921, which let peasants know ahead of time how much they would need
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to deliver. This had the important effect of changing incentives and getting the peasants to
produce more, because they knew they would get to keep all of their produce after the tax quota
was reached. After the currency was stabilized in 1924, the tax in kind was replaced by a money
tax. The minimal attempts to collectivize agriculture were also abandoned, and the land was left
almost entirely in private hands, all the way to the end of NEP. As intended, these policies
immediately boosted agricultural production, and by 1925, the total sown area matched the 1913
level. However, the government continued to be the principal buyer of grain from the peasants
and offered incredibly low prices, which made them more likely to eat their produce than sell it.
In addition, the revolution led to the redistribution of land and with it, fewer landlords and
kulaks, large landholders who had been responsible for most grain sales. As a result, despite the
recovery of total farm output, both domestic sales and exports of grain remained far below prewar levels. This was one of main reasons Stalin decided to abandon NEP and collectivize
agriculture.30
Conclusion
The Bolshevik attempt to do away with money created economic chaos and domestic
unrest, which led them to abandon in kind distribution and establish a stable currency. The value
of the ruble first started to fall during the First World War, after the Imperial government went
off of the gold standard and started printing unbacked paper currency to pay for its military
expenditures. Rising food prices benefitted Russia‟s peasant farmers at the expense of city
dwellers, who had to buy their products. The food supply in the capital of Petrograd grew
especially dire, and riots led to the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II. The Provisional Government
took over, but it continued the war effort and printed money even faster, so food shortages
continued. The Bolsheviks then came to power, claiming they could fix the economy and
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provide food for the population. By that time, the ruble was already in steep decline, and the
Bolsheviks had the choice to either try to save it or move forward with establishing a moneyless
economy. Initially, they made some efforts to keep the budget balanced by trying to bring it
revenue and restrain spending, but these measures were unsuccessful due to a breakdown in the
tax system and continuing military expenditures due to the Civil War.
By 1919, the Bolsheviks had nationalized most of Russia‟s industries and the ruble
showed no sign of stabilizing, so they decided it was time to institute centrally planned in kind
resource allocation and do away with money. The central bank was given unlimited freedom to
print money as it saw fit, and price increases officially moved into hyperinflation territory. Even
though the Civil War started to wind down in 1920, industrial and agricultural output continued
to plummet due to the Bolshevik policies. Russia was afflicted with a major famine in 1921 and
peasants began to revolt out of fear that they would be next to starve. These revolts and the
Kronstadt sailors rebellion convinced Lenin that the government had to legalize some market
activity and establish a stable currency after all, or else the Bolsheviks would not be able to hold
power for much longer. Stabilization finally occurred in 1923, in an economically predictable
fashion, when the Soviet government balanced its budget, issued a gold-backed currency, and
made the central bank independent again.
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CHAPTER 3
REPRESSED INFLATION AND SHORTAGES

By artificially fixing prices and repressing inflation, the Soviet system of price controls
created persistent shortages of food and consumer goods. The price control system was
established after Stalin decided to do away with the New Economic Policy in 1928 and remained
in place as long as the Soviet Union existed. Before and during the Second World War, the
Soviet economy suffered from both open inflation, as official prices in state stores increased a
moderate rate every year, but market prices in collective farm markets increased even faster.
Both types of inflation were eradicated in 1947 with a currency reform, but only open inflation
was conquered for long. For the rest of the post-war era, prices in state stores and co-operatives
were strictly controlled and subsidized, so they changed very little until the late 1980s. This
caused the economy to suffer from repressed inflation, which can be defined as rising excess
demand that leads to excess liquid assets in the hands of the population instead of higher prices. 1
Because production was controlled by political authorities, rising demand did not lead to a
greater supply, and shortages were pervasive in the Soviet economy. As a result, the standard of
living in the Soviet Union was far below what it was in the West.
Open and Repressed Inflation: 1921-1949
Despite the government‟s efforts, prices were set mostly by market forces during the
early 1920s. In 1921, when NEP began, the Bolsheviks established a Prices Committee under
the Commissariat of Finance. This committee was given the authority to set prices for goods
sold by state enterprises or purchased by the government from private sources, such as peasants.
However, these attempts to control prices were largely ineffective, and traders were usually able
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to negotiate prices themselves. Inflation was rampant during these years, and it was necessary to
change prices frequently in order for them to have any meaning. A majority of retail turnover
was private prior to 1924-25, which made it easier to avoid price controls. In 1923, free pricing
led to what is known as the “scissors crisis.” Whereas peasants previously had favorable terms
of trade with the city, this situation reversed itself as industrial prices rose much faster than
agricultural. A variety of factors were responsible for this, the most important of which being
that Russia‟s harvests recovered far more quickly than its industrial production.* At the peak of
the crisis in October 1923, industrial prices were three times higher than agricultural prices, in
comparison to 1913.2
In response to the “scissors crisis,” the Soviet government began to impose stricter price
controls on state and cooperative sales. Prices became easier for the government to control as
private trade declined and state industry expanded in the latter half of the 1920s. This policy had
predictable results that continued for the rest of Soviet history: shortages of consumer goods,
long lines in front of stores, selective access to goods, and a gap between official and free prices.
The goal of the controls was to lower prices for peasants in the village, but the effect was the
opposite. Those who lived in cities, near the factories, were able to purchase goods at the low
official prices, and the stores quickly sold out. Private traders would then transport the cheap
goods they had just purchased to the villages and sell them at much higher rates, a practice that
was derided as speculation. Members of cooperatives and trade unions also had greater access to
goods, much as Communist Party members and others with connections later did. According to
official statistics, the fiscal year of 1926-27 actually saw slight deflation, and food prices only
*

Pickersgill’s statistics, cited in Chapter 1, seem to indicate that industrial output grew faster than agricultural, but
Alec Nove cites figures that show the opposite and explains why this was so. Agriculture recovered quickly as
peasant planted and harvested more crops, but industries simply took longer to physically rebuild after years of
destruction.
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rose by 10.5 percent by 1929. However, these figures do not take into account private food
prices, which rose continuously after 1926 and more than doubled by 1929. The disparity for
manufactured goods was not quite as significant, but private prices remained higher and rose
faster.3
Table 7. Comparison of Private and Official Prices, 1926-1929

1926 (December)
1927 (December)
1928 (June)
1929 (June)

(1913 = 100)
Food
Manufactures
Private Official Private Official
198
181
251
208
222
175
240
188
293
184
253
190
450
200
279
192
Nove, 157.

After NEP ended, the Soviet government introduced a multi-tiered price system with
varying degrees of price controls. In 1928-29, rationing of food and consumer good became
widespread throughout Russia. According to Alec Nove, this was “perhaps the first and only
recorded instance of the introduction of rationing in time of peace.”4 Goods were sold at the
official ration prices in state stores, which required ration coupons, but other types of stores had
other price levels, ranging from controlled to free. Workers were able to purchase some items
from special shops that were closed to the public, where prices were higher but the workers were
able to get items unavailable elsewhere. Food and manufactured goods were also sold to the
working class in other stores for prices that were above rationed levels, but below commercial
prices. Other stores, known as torgsin, had goods available only in exchange for precious metals
or foreign currency, which the state badly needed. Finally, prices freely were set by market
forces at peasant bazaars, kolkhoz (collective farm) markets, and black markets.5
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Unsurprisingly, prices rose much faster where they were influenced by market forces,
than in state stores, in which inflationary pressure manifested itself in shortages instead.
Artificially low prices led to products selling out quickly and shelves laying barren until the next
delivery. In state stores, consumers were expected to take whatever they could find and move
on. These problems developed as soon the government was able to effectively enforce price
controls and continued, to varying degrees, for the rest of Soviet history. Consumer demand that
went unfulfilled in state stores spilled over into the tiny market sector. Because the free sector
was so small in comparison to the excess demand created at state stores, market prices often had
to be several times higher than official ones, in order for supply and demand to balance. For
instance, commercial prices, which were set by the state but close to market rates, were twenty
times higher for bread in 1933, six times higher for sugar, and fourteen times higher for
sunflower oil.6
Although data are somewhat limited, the chart below makes clear that the free prices at
collective farm markets were usually much higher than the official prices in state stores in
cooperatives. This gap between official and market prices shows that repressed inflation also
became a problem very early in Soviet times. Nevertheless, there was also open inflation in state
stores during this time, for two reasons. First, wage increases were higher than productivity
gains, because enterprise managers tried to hire as many workers as possible in an effort to fulfill
overly ambitious plan targets. This led not only to overstaffing but also higher wages as each
enterprise tried to offer higher wages in order to lure workers in. Second, investments in heavy
industry during the 1930s were much higher than they were for consumer goods. Thus, many
workers toiled and received their wages without creating any goods that they could purchase.
Again, these problems also existed for most of the Soviet period, but authorities chose to keep
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inflation repressed in the post-war era.7
Table 8. Soviet Price Trends, 1928-1956 (in rubles)
Year
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

Basic Industrial
Goods (excluding
petroleum)
100
98
96
96
97
100
101
103
157
175
180
201
231
240
244
246
249
249
249
249
249
669
556
551
523
523
523
510
497

Average Annual
Wage (Workers)
100
114
133
160
203 / 226*
223
264
323
406
432
493
579
822
992
1,128
1,140
1,164
1,190
1,204
1,240

Prices in State
and Co-operative
Stores
100
200 / 255
400
700
700
840
1000
2,545
3,180
3,895
3,235
2,770
2,215
2,035
1,925
1,740
1,640
1,640
1,640

Prices in
Collective Farm
Markets
100+
630
3000(max) / 769
1,500-2,000
1,200-1,680
900-1,470
700+
700+
1,780
2,220
13,850
31,220
26,335
13,575
11,530
4,175
2,880
2,770
2,810
3,100
2,595
2,855
2,855
2,610

*Alternative 1932 figures from Nove, 204, 206.
Source: Holzman, “Soviet Inflationary Pressures,” 168-169.
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Inflation started getting out of control during the Second World War. Due to the
necessary war expenditures, the Soviet government started running its first budget deficits since
the stabilization under NEP and was forced to pay for some percentage of these with new
currency issues. During the war, strict price controls and subsidies kept inflation in official
stores limited. However, collective farm market prices began increasing much faster than they
had during the 1930s and reached hyperinflationary levels during the war. After 1944, the
government was able to balance its budget again and increase the supply of goods in state stores,
so the rate of inflation began to decline from the peak of 1943. Nevertheless, official prices were
almost four times higher in 1947 than they had been in 1940, while kolkhoz prices were six and a
half times higher than 1940 levels and four times higher than state prices at the time. Thus, the
Soviet economy was suffering from both high rates of both open and repressed inflation. 8
Inflation was wiped out in the Soviet Union with the Currency Reform of 1947. Under
this reform, old rubles were mandatorily exchanged for new ones at a 10 to 1 ratio. As Franklyn
Holzman argues, there were other ways that the Soviet government could have eliminated
repressed inflation, such as higher prices and taxes. However, as in the First World War, higher
food prices benefitted the peasants more than other groups, i.e. workers, and left more cash in
their hands. Of course, Soviet leaders had always been biased against peasants and wanted to
eliminate inflation at the expense of peasants, not workers. Higher prices would have been
detrimental to workers, while the currency requisition and reform took purchasing power away
from the peasants. The currency reform was indeed successful in getting rid of inflation for the
time being. Official prices began to deflate and continued to do so until the mid-1950s. This
was largely because productivity began growing faster than wages and nonconsumption
expenditures fell, in contrast to the previous two decades. Collective farm market prices also fell
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for the few years after the reform, but began to separate from official prices again after 1950.
Repressed inflation was simply unavoidable as long as price controls remained and continued to
plague the Soviet economy until the collapse. 9
Repressed Inflation: 1949-1985
Since Stalin, Soviet leaders were determined to increase the country's economic growth,
but they attempted to do so without paying attention to the laws of economics. The state
controlled almost all the means of production, and most economic decisions were made by the
authorities. Administrative bodies set target production goals and allocated capital and labor as
they considered necessary. Planners aimed to increase output as much as possible and were not
concerned with shortages on the consumer market. They distributed currency based on political
considerations, without any need to repay it, essentially making money a “free good” to
producers. Managers were rewarded for increasing the gross value of their output, which was
calculated by adding up the cost of inputs, so they were incredibly wasteful with their resources.
Inevitably, the Soviet system created “enormous disproportions, some of which had serious
consequences.” Its inefficiency was, however, masked by the country's abundant labor and raw
materials.10
After decades of rapidly growing output and living standards, the Soviet economy began
to slow down around 1970, while supply and demand started to become more unbalanced.
Ironically, economic stagnation began during Brezhnev's “gross output drive.” Under this
strategy, Soviet planners went back to the old strategy of focusing on rapid growth in heavy
industry and defense, while ignoring consumption. The focus on haste and pure quantity,
without consideration for the quality of products or consumers‟ needs, led to waste, inefficiency,
and low growth rates in the long run. The growth of inputs decreased, as resources were used
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too quickly, capital stock was allowed to age, and workers had no incentive to increase
productivity. External factors, such as lower prices for exported materials also played a role.
Neglecting research and development led to slow adaptation to new technologies and new
products. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union's GNP growth dropped to nearly half of what it
was in the 1960s and virtually stagnated by the early 1980s. In addition, a “large and growing
gap appeared between the goals of the producer and the needs of the consumer.”11

Source: Hanson, 5.

Because food prices were subsidized and the supply of consumer goods was not
increased, many workers saved a portion of their incomes. Ever since raising prices on meat and
butter in 1962 led to a riot in Novocherkassk, the authorities tried to avoid raising prices on basic
food items. In 1965, Brezhnev‟s chief economic minister Kosygin introduced a reform that
included retail price subsidies for basic foods, in order to keep their prices stable. Workers‟
wages, however, did not stay stable. In a centrally planned economy, the production sector is not
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supposed to be part of the monetary economy. The Soviet state bank provided enterprises with
credits needed for inputs, and balances remaining in accounts were wiped at the end of each year.
However, the production center still contributed to monetary expansion through wage payments.
Yet with food prices subsidized and shortages on the consumer market, workers chose to save
part of their income.12
Although many authors assume that the savings were forced, Peter Boettke argues that
individuals chose to save their incomes voluntarily, with the expectation that goods would be
available later. Interviews with Russians who lived through the Soviet times confirm this
argument. “People save in order to consume later,” write Birman and Clarke, “so savings in
general can be defined as delayed demand for consumer goods.”13 While some did save up
thousands of rubles during the course of their life, it was done in the hopes of buying a car later
or simply as a rainy day fund. Although the selection in stores was indeed bland and meager,
some Russians spent their extra income on vacations or new appliances and did not amass any
significant savings. Domenico Nuti has also claimed that the population could spend any extra
income in the small free sector that continued to exist in the collective farms and black markets.
Although this may have been true to some extent, Russians who were interviewed did not
consider these sales very significant.14
Since the 1970s, workers almost continuously earned more money than they spent and
savings continued to grow. In the second half of the 1980s, the gap between income and
spending became much larger. As a result, the percentage of income put into savings also grew.
In 1980, the population saved 4.1 percent of their wages and the number continued to grow
throughout the decade, reaching 13 percent by the first quarter of 1991. As demand grew from
increased savings, supply did not increase accordingly, and the result was more shortages and
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longer lines. The increase in demand should have caused prices to increase, but because prices
were fixed, it instead led to repressed inflation. According to Byung-Yeon Kim, the proportion
of forced savings of the total increased from 9 percent in 1965 to 42 percent in 1989. It is
possible that the savings truly did become in voluntary in the late 1980s as wages were increased
far more rapidly than they had been before, but shortages became even worse. Whether Soviet
savings were forced or voluntary, savings by Soviet citizens served no productive purpose.
Rather than financing investment, as savings would in a market economy, and simply languished
in bank accounts.15
The growing accumulation of savings became “monetary overhang,” in economic terms,
and caused a drastic increase in the Soviet money supply. The government had tried to control
both consumer demand and cash holdings, but lost control over both, as a result of the 1965
reform. Producers used cash only to pay their employees, so the primary constituent of money
supply was cash held by the population, including savings bank deposits and state bonds.
According to Birman and Clarke, only 15-30 billion rubles were needed for cash circulation in
1985, yet the actual money supply at that time was over 200 billion rubles. By their estimates,
the total money supply was an astonishing seven to ten times what was needed for regular use.
The population was overpaid in relation to how few consumer items were available to buy. They
became increasingly frustrated at shortages and long lines. The state could no longer increase
labor productivity, its “most pressing objective,” because additional money was no longer an
incentive to work harder. Consumer demand vastly exceeded supply, and the Soviet economy
moved further from equilibrium.16
Effects
Communism simply failed to provide the high standard of living that it promised to
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ordinary people and never came close to matching the relative prosperity of the West. Per capita
income in the Soviet Union peaked at just over one-third of United States levels, yet even this
number overestimates their well-being. After all, increasing yearly output, as measured in
macroeconomic statistics, does not necessarily correlate with improving conditions for the
masses. This is true even for market economies, but statistics and reality were even farther apart
in the command system. Both in the Five-Year-Plans and their subsequent implementation,
Soviet officials prioritized allocation of resources towards defense and heavy industry over
consumer goods. As Philip Hanson puts it, “If steel, say, was in shorter supply than originally
planned, it was the production of bicycles that would lose out, not that of tanks or machinetools.”17 Estimates show that in the 1980s, about 50-55 percent of Soviet GNP went towards
consumption and anywhere from 10 to 25 percent to the military, compared to 65 percent and 7
percent in the United States, respectively. Agricultural production accounted for about 30
percent of Soviet GDP, as opposed to only around 2 percent in the United States, but the Soviet
collective farms were notoriously inefficient. These factors created never-ending shortages of
food and consumer goods, which often meant that even if workers had money to spend, there
was nothing worthwhile available for them to purchase. 18
The results of the central planners‟ priorities were telling. The Soviet military was long
considered to be on par with that of the United States, with its much larger economy. The tradeoff was dismal conditions for consumers. On average, Americans and Soviets ate almost the
same amount of calories per day (3300 and 3380), but the comparison ends there. A commonly
used indicator of consumer living standards is the proportion of their incomes that goes to food
costs. In the mid-1980s, the average Soviet spent 59 percent of his or her monthly income on
food, versus only 15.2 percent for average Americans. This was even worse than in 1927, when
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Soviet workers spent 43.8 of their income on food. The quality of Soviet diets was also much
poorer. Bread and potatoes made up 46 percent of daily caloric intake, while meat and fish only
accounted for 8 percent, if lard and by-products are not included. For the United States, these
numbers were 22 and 20 percent, respectively. Amazingly, per capita meat consumption for the
Russian/Soviet Empire was actually lower in 1985 than it was in 1913, falling from 88 kilograms
annually to 62 kilograms. Fresh fruit and vegetables were only available during harvest time in
the Soviet Union, and almost non-existent otherwise. Indeed, Philip Hanson states that bread,
potatoes, and vodka were the only food products that were not usually in shortage. 19
Other basic indicators of living standards, such as housing and clothing, were no better
than the food supply. Lenin had once declared that each person should get 9 square meters of
housing space, and indeed, by 1989, the median allotment was estimated between 9 and 12
square meters. The corresponding figure the United States was 55.3 square meters per person.
Getting an apartment at all was usually difficult, and people had to often wait for years before
one was allocated to them. Soviet consumption of textile products per person was 30 percent of
U.S. levels and a 97.6 percent for shoes. 20 Although clothes and shoes were usually available in
Russian stores, the selection was usually very poor. Clothing stores generally had racks of
identically styled items, with perhaps two color variations. The selection of shoes was also poor,
and some people called Soviet shoes “wooden” because they were uncomfortable. However,
others argue that Soviet shoes were better quality and lasted longer than the cheap off-brand
shoes available in the former Soviet Union today. 21
One of the major weaknesses of the Soviet economy was a lag in acquiring new
technologies and new products, and this was reflected in the population. Soviet housing was not
only smaller, but also of lower quality than in the United States. Figures from 1986 show that 80
49

percent of American homes had central heating, 75 percent were connected to sewers, and 59
percent were air-conditioned. In the Soviet Union, most apartments were heated by oldfashioned radiators, hot water was often unavailable, and air conditioning unheard-of. While 90
percent of American households had telephones, a meager 10-12 percent did in the Soviet Union,
and even these were often on shared lines with neighbors. † Overall Soviet consumption of
durable goods was 14 percent of the United States level. Washing and drying machines
remained rare, and many Soviets continued to wash their clothes by hand and dry them on
clotheslines. Televisions were as ubiquitous as in the United States, although the quality was
lower, and black and white sets were not uncommon. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had
only 200,000 computers in 1987, compared to 25 million in the United States. Another of the
greatest disparities was in the availability of cars, which stood around 7 percent of the U.S. levels
in 1988, 55 cars for every 1000 people compared to 771 per 1000. 22
Table 9. USSR: Household Access to Utilities
and Other Amenities, 1989 (in percent)
State Private
Central heating
85
12
Water supply
87
21
Sewage
84
11
Hot water
69
3
Gas stove
81
75
Electric stove
14
1
Bathroom or shower 77
8
Telephone
37
12
Source: IMF, 340.

Finally, the best indicator of Soviet living standards may be the state of health and

†

I can still remember from when I was very young, my family had a neighbor named Lyuba who liked to talk on the
phone for long periods of time and often tied up the shared phone line. However, I was shocked to now learn that
only 1 in 10 families even had a telephone and had to verify this statistic across three sources.
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medical services. Medical care was guaranteed to the entire Soviet population and provided for
free, but the quality was incredibly poor. Shortages extended even to hospitals and contributed
to alarming health problems in the Soviet Union. In the late 1980s, one out of six hospitals
lacked running water entirely, and about 30 percent were not connected to sewer lines.

In 1988,

the USSR minister of health estimated that, overall, there were seven to ten times fewer facilities
per hospital bed than in the United States.‡ Pharmacies were likewise affected by shortages, and
it was often difficult for people to get their necessary medicines. Of course, health care in the
United States was vastly more expensive, yet American consumption of medical services was
still three times higher.23
Another major source of health problems for Soviets was pollution in the environment.
In the worst areas, health risks from pollution were estimated to be 10 to 100 times than
acceptable levels in the West. For most of the Soviet era, environmental concerns were largely
ignored, and the first official data on the state of the environment and associated health effects
was not published until 1988. Many industries used old and inefficient machinery, and 38
percent of emission sources were not even equipped for pollution control. As a result, it has
been estimated that air pollutant levels in Soviet cities were from 10 to 50 times higher than in
Germany or France. Due to air pollution (and most likely, nearly ubiquitous smoking habits),
rates of death from respiratory illnesses were 2.8 times higher for men and 1.7 times higher for
women than in several Western countries. Improper waste disposal and the lack of sewer
systems led to poor water quality and disease outbreaks. Municipal water was not adequately
purified, and many Soviets continued to drink from wells and natural flowing water, which could
often become contaminated. Poor water quality led to 900,000 cases of hepatitis per years,
sixteen times higher than the United States. Soviet farms continued to use the notorious
‡

It is unclear from the source which specific facilities the minister of health had in mind.
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pesticide DDT 20 years after it was banned in the West, and 10 percent of Soviet food samples
were found to be unsafe for human consumption.

The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in 1986 was

a watershed moment that caused great concern for the environment and anger at the
government‟s mishandling of it.24
A few statistics on life and death illustrate where the overall health situation stood in the
Soviet Union. Cancer rates for males were 1.5 times higher than in the West, although women
fared better with a comparative ratio of 1.04. In 1985, the Soviet infant mortality rate was 25.1
deaths in the first year per 1,000 births, significantly higher than the United States at 10.4 and
even East Germany at 9.2.25 However, many would-be infants never even had a chance. As
with other consumer goods and pharmaceuticals, contraceptives were either unavailable or of
low quality. On the other hand, abortion was easily available and free under the Soviet medical
system, so it became the primary method of birth control. The average Soviet woman had about
two abortions during her childbearing years, but it was not uncommon to have more than five, or
even upwards of ten.26 Soviet life expectancies increased by an impressive 20 years during the
Stalin era, but then they actually started dropping after hitting a peak in the early 1970s. The
Table 10. Average Life Expectancy at Birth
in the Soviet Union (in years)
Year
Total Population
1938-39
46.9
1955-56
67
1958-59
68.9
1971-72
69.5
1978-79
67.9
1983-84
67.9
1984
67.7
1985
68.4
1986
69.6

Men Women
44.0
49.7
63
69
64.4
71.7
64.5
73.6
62.5
72.6
62.6
72.8
62.4
72.6
63.3
72.9
65.0
73.6

Source: Ryan, 1513.
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average for men fell by two years, from 64.5 to 62.5 and for women by one year, from 73.6 to
72.6. Only in 1985 did the numbers begin to grow again. By contrast, U.S. life expectancies
were slightly higher in 1972 and continued to grow steadily ever since, from 67.4 and 75.1 in
1972 to 71.1 and 78.2 in 1984.27
Discussion
In the former Soviet Union, people now face high unemployment and long for the
guaranteed jobs that existed under communism, yet this practice was responsible for many of the
aforementioned economic woes. Unemployment was virtually non-existent in the Soviet Union
until the Gorbachev era because excess demand for labor was intrinsic to the system. Soviet
laws made it difficult to fire workers, but firms rarely even wanted to do so. Due to high output
targets and shortages of resources, enterprises tried to compensate by hiring as many workers as
possible. This ensured a certain level of comfort for the workers, but it did little to increase their
material prosperity. Soviet labor was inefficient and misallocated, which is why shortages
prevailed for most products and there was little for workers to buy. Low labor productivity
became one of the major problems of the Soviet economy in the post-war era. The threat of
repression under Stalin went a long way towards ensuring plan discipline, but the liberalization
that began under Khrushchev caused discipline to soften. This left Soviet workers with neither
carrot nor stick to motivate them. If they did not work hard, it was unlikely they would get fired
or punished. If they did work hard, they were unlikely to be rewarded with better pay, and even
if they were, there was not much available to purchase with it. § Ironically, the situation would
not have improved much even if Soviet workers had exerted more effort. Some enterprises
employed too many workers, other did not have enough, and there was no guarantee that any of

§

The well-known Soviet cliché was “We pretend to work, and you pretend to pay us.”
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them were producing goods that were valuable to consumers. 28
Communism was supposed to serve the needs of workers, but the Soviet system was not
structurally capable of doing so. After all, when workers go to spend their paychecks they
become consumers. In a free market, competing firms decide which goods to produce, their
amounts, and their prices based on signals from consumers. Of course, this process is the
antithesis of communism. In the early days, the Bolsheviks attempted to establish a moneyless
system where the state rationed out everything in kind directly to workers. This experiment
failed and they were forced to acquiesce to commodity production and wage labor. After the
brief interlude of the New Economic Policy ended in 1928, the Soviet state essentially became a
monopoly corporation responsible for paying and producing everything for its citizens. Workers
were still paid money wages and used these for whatever they were willing and able to purchase,
just as in a capitalist system. The primary difference was that instead of independent businesses
competing with each other for consumers‟ money, every Soviet firm was part of a single
hierarchy in which central planners made all of the decisions about production. The General
Secretary was ultimately responsible for all decisions, while the Politburo and lower ministries
designed the plans and passed them on to the enterprises, farms, etc. Thus, producers were only
beholden to the planners above them and were not responsive to the wishes of consumers. The
planners had no particular reason to care about public well-being and could ignore growing
consumer demand, so the consumer market remained in a perpetual state of shortage even as
total output was growing.29
To varying degrees, shortages plagued the Soviet consumer market from the time of the
revolution all the way to the collapse. Under Lenin and Stalin, the Soviet Union experienced
three major famines, two hyperinflations, and little material improvement for consumers. The
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Soviet people hoped that Stalin would finally relax his repressive policies after the war and focus
on improving the lives of workers, as the official ideology dictated. Instead, many of those
liberated from Nazi-occupied lands were sent off to gulags, and the Soviet Union was afflicted
with its third famine. After Stalin‟s death, Khrushchev shifted investment priorities towards
consumption and agriculture, which did improve per capita consumption and caused inequality
to decrease. There were no more chaotic upheavals or mass starvations, but shelves were often
empty, queues could be long, and the quality of products was poor. Consumption continued to
grow under Brezhnev, yet incomes grew faster than the supply of goods, so shortages persisted.
Midway through Brezhnev‟s tenure, even the official GNP growth rates slowed down, and the
Soviet Union ceased to be catching up with the United States after 1973. By Gorbachev‟s time,
the economy had almost completely stagnated, and he felt that perestroika was necessary to get
the economy growing again and improve conditions for its citizens. 30

Source: Hanson, 244.
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Conclusion
Price controls led to repressed inflation and never-ending shortages in the Soviet
economy. The Soviet government first instituted price controls in the late 1920s, and the results
were usually the same ever since. State stores and co-operates that sold goods at official prices
usually had shortages, and consumers were unable to find the products they wanted. However,
even the official stores continued to have open inflation until the end of the Second World War,
due to excess wage payments and production plans that ignored consumer goods. In 1947, a
currency reform eliminated both open and repressed inflation and temporarily reversed the
previous inflationary pressures. However, wages again began to be increased more than
productivity gains, and central planners resuming ignoring consumer needs. As repressed
inflation increased, shortages became pervasive and workers saved more of their incomes. Many
items that were ubiquitous in the West were virtually unavailable in the Soviet Union, and the
standard of living in general was much lower.
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CHAPTER 4
RUSSIA‟S SECOND HYPERINFLATION

Mikhail Gorbachev‟s economic reforms of the late 1980s, known as perestroika, and the
hyperinflation that followed in the early 1990s were traumatic events for former Soviet citizens
and contributed to a growing skepticism about the desirability of a free markets and democracy.
Initially, much of the Soviet population supported perestroika and hoped that it would solve
communism‟s problems, such as persistent shortages and general poverty compared to the West.
Indeed, Gorbachev‟s reforms were intended to increase economic growth and improve the supply
of consumer goods, but the results were the exact opposite. Inflation and declining output made
shortages even more acute, and the Soviet public suffered even more than they had during the
previous decades of communism. Hyperinflation also caused real incomes to drop, wiped out
life savings, and made food very difficult to find. Although it was caused by the legacy of
communism, hyperinflation occurred during the first several years of capitalism and democracy,
creating a negative first impression of these social systems. These years, the early 1990s,
brought prosperity only to the very few, while the vast majority experienced poverty, chaos, and
immense hardship. This has led many of inflation‟s victims to desire stability, even if it means a
partial return to authoritarian politics and a managed economy.
Perestroika
By the time Gorbachev came to power, most Soviet citizens agreed that the economy had
problems and needed some sort of change in order to improve. They could see that labor often
went to waste, the supply of goods had hardly changed in many years, and there was little visible
improvement in little standards.1 While this was apparent to the general populace, Gorbachev
59

was the first Soviet leader to publicly admit that central planning was not working and suggest
trying something different.

Almost immediately after becoming General Secretary, Gorbachev

began to speak about the need to improve the supply of consumer goods and agricultural
products. The previous leaders that followed Stalin had also made some efforts to improve
agriculture and consumption, but Gorbachev could see that these efforts had been largely
insufficient. He was more honest about the depth of the problems than his predecessors had been
and placed greater emphasis on the need for change. Gorbachev argued that the economy was
wasteful and inefficient, and if it continued along the same track, the promise of socialism would
never be fulfilled. The economy had been virtually stagnant for over a decade and was falling
further behind the West, so Gorbachev feared that simply maintaining the status quo could lead
to the Soviet Union facing worker revolts, as Poland had in 1980, and losing its superpower
status.2
Soviet citizens already knew that the economy was in bad shape, but they hoped that
Gorbachev‟s frank assessment of the situation and commitment to fixing it would bring real
improvement. Before Gorbachev, the Soviet government was not exactly known for its honesty
in reporting the shortcomings of communism and tried to censor any information that did so.
Nevertheless, shortages were obvious for Soviet consumers and were the subject of the famously
cynical Soviet political humor. Earlier in the post-war era, people living in the Soviet Union at
least saw gradual improvement every year, but since the Era of Stagnation began around 1975, it
was difficult to even have hope for the future. When Gorbachev admitted that the economy was
failing and needed restructuring, they were more surprised by their leader‟s honesty than his
message. Few still believed in the lofty visions of communism that had been promised by Marx
and Lenin, but many did accept the notion that Gorbachev could at least improve their society,
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including the supply of goods and services. A Soviet sociologist reported that between 35 and
43 percent of the population supported perestroika from 1985 to 1987, while a poll by two major
American news agencies found a much higher 73 percent in favor in 1988. 3
After raising hopes for significant positive change, Gorbachev‟s actual reforms managed
to be both timid and deleterious. In the early years of perestroika, Gorbachev did not have a
specific strategy in mind, and his early measures were quite traditional. In an effort to improve
labor discipline and raise productivity, Gorbachev tried to drastically restrict the production and
consumption of alcohol. Like many of his measures, the anti-alcohol campaign had good
intentions and reasons behind it but turned out to be highly unpopular and ineffective. The
Russian imperial government had attempted a similar policy during the First World War, and the
results were the same in both cases: budget deficits increased due to a loss of sales tax revenue,
while Russians continued to drink homemade moonshine, known as samogon. Gorbachev‟s
second early policy was uskorenie, or acceleration, which raised investment spending on new
technologies to try to accelerate growth. In practice, much of this new investment went into the
defense sector, while the priority of agriculture and consumption was downgraded to
compensate. Obviously, this did little to benefit consumers and it also failed to increase overall
growth. Meanwhile, both of these policies contributed to growing budget deficits, which were
one of the main causes of inflation. 4
The reforms of the middle period (1987-1988) initiated the growth of inflation and the
collapse of the command economy. Gorbachev and other top officials were still not ready to
consider creating markets or private property, but they took some measures to decentralize
decision making, legalize unplanned activity, and increase trade with the world. However, these
halfway measures only created more problems. They relaxed some of the central controls over
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the economy, but in such a way that caused the breakdown of the socialist system without
replacing it with a functioning market. The most important reform in this period was the law on
state enterprises, passed in 1987. The intent of the law was to make enterprises responsible for
their own management and finances, but in practice, the central government continued to both
control many of their decisions and subsidize their accounts. Thus, the reform did nothing to
address the old problems of shortages and soft budget constraints. Enterprises did get more
freedom over their decisions, but this did more harm than good because they continued to get
bailed out when they ran losses.5
Decentralization gave enterprises more power to determine production plans, wages, and
prices, and it allowed them to shift balances from input accounts that were previously eliminated
annually.

This essentially monetized the production sector, whose contributions to the money

supply were previously limited to just wage payments. Under these conditions, competition and
efficiency did not improve. Since their inputs remained free, enterprises tended to raise wages
more than was justified by additional production, “contrary to declared government policy.”
This was also an old problem, but Gorbachev‟s reforms only made it worse. Enterprises were
able to increase profits simply by increasing prices within set limits. However, due to the nature
of the system, some of these price increases were ultimately paid for by the state, which further
contributed to monetary expansion. Since wages and prices were both increased without an
accompanying increase in production, this only created inflation without alleviating shortages.6
Finally, Gorbachev's reform also created greater shortages by allowing enterprises to “siphon”
goods off the consumer market with their spare funds. 7
Another important law from the middle period was the law on cooperatives from 1988,
which essentially legalized private enterprise within certain parameters. The existing state
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enterprises and newly legalized cooperatives and banks were given just enough freedom to act
outside of the planned system, but not enough to do so in a way that was economically healthy.
The cooperatives and banks were essentially private companies, but in practice, they were often
connected to state enterprises. The inputs for enterprises were still financed by the state, but
their managers were able to move these funds through the less regulated banks and cooperatives
to accumulate personal profit. For instance, an enterprise could get easy credit from an affiliated
bank and use it to pay a family member‟s cooperative for bogus services; or they could sell stateprovided goods to the cooperative at the low official price, and the cooperative was then free to
raise prices and resell the goods. The involved parties would share the profits, which came at the
expense of the state budget.8
During Gorbachev‟s tenure, state budget deficits spiraled out of control and were
financed largely by monetary emissions. The state budget had always played a huge role in the
Soviet economy and was responsible for distributing about 60 percent of national income.
Budgets started growing since the early 1970s, and many sources suggest that deficits probably
existed even earlier, although official Soviet records only admit deficits after 1985. Since 1968,
the State Bank covered budget deficits with credits, which were never paid off. Instead, the bank
covered the shortfall by printing new rubles, which contributed created inflationary pressure.
However, as Gur Ofer shows, deficits only became a serious problem after Gorbachev‟s reforms.
In the early 1980s, the budget deficit was a manageable 2 percent of GDP, but by 1989, it had
grown to about 11 percent. By the end of 1991, the Soviet budget deficit had reached an
estimated 20 percent. Likewise, the amount of money printed to cover the deficit rose sharply
after 1985. However, since prices remained controlled, most of the new money printed simply
accumulated in bank accounts and did not create much open inflation. From 1987 to 1991, total
63

bank deposits remained about 7 or 8 times higher than money in circulation, an excess known as
monetary overhang.9
Table 11. Indicators of Money Supply and Overhang, 1987-1991
(in billions of rubles as of January 1st, except where noted)
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
July 1, 1991

Money in
Circulation (a)
74.8
80.6
91.6
109.5
136.1
157.6

Total Bank
Deposits (b)
593.2
631.6
702.6
781.2
944.6
1325.5

Overhang
Indicator (b/a)
7.93
7.83
7.67
7.13
6.94
8.41

Source: Filatochev and Bradshaw, 742.

Several factors combined to cause the growing deficits during the Gorbachev years. Total
revenue fell from reduced production and efficiency. Gorbachev‟s anti-alcohol campaign failed
to produce the desired increase in productivity, while cutting alcohol‟s share of budget revenue
from 12-14 percent down to 3.5 percent. As far as external factors, the fall of oil prices and
production in the mid-1980s caused export revenue to decline. After 1987, the state cut spending
on investment from about 20 percent of GNP to 13 percent, but the accompanying decline in
revenue from profit taxes nearly canceled out the budget cut. According to official figures,
defense spending fell from about 9 percent of GNP in the 1980s to 7.5 percent in 1990. Other
estimates, such as that of Philip Hanson, put the share of defense spending in GNP as high as 17
percent, although they also agreed that the percentage was shrinking. Social welfare spending,
however, increased slightly from 14 percent, a major part of which was price subsidies.10
Retail price subsidies were a major cause of the Soviet budget deficit and repressed
inflation. The government maintained the retail subsidies instituted in 1965, and food prices
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remained almost unchanged by the late 1980s. As a result, the share of the true price paid by
consumers continuously declined, from 50-80 percent in 1970 to 25-40 percent in the late 1980s.
The remainder of the price was paid by the state, so the portion of the budget spent on subsidies
went from 4 percent to 20 percent in the late 1980s. This amounted to 11-15 percent of total
national income. The effects of continuing budget subsidies mounted: savings accumulated,
shortages continued, market disequilibrium worsened, and the budget deficit increased. After
stabilizing at around 4 percent in the 1970s and early 1980s, the deficit accounted for 10 percent
of the budget in the middle of the decade and reached 18-19 percent by 1988-9. Although
several other aforementioned factors contributed to the deficit as well, Byung-Yeon Kim argues
that “one of the most important was subsidy expenditure.” The policy was also partly
responsible for the decline in revenue, since more taxes on turnover and profits would have been
collected from higher priced goods.11
In light of price subsidies and other factors, internal and external, the Soviet budget
situation became dire in the late 1980s. Because the state used more of its resources for
consumption, less of the budget went toward investment and the creation of new wealth, which
was supposed to be one of its main functions according to the central planning model. Whereas
expenditure on investment stood at 10.3 percent of the GDP and subsidies at 5.8 percent from
1971-75, these respectively halved and doubled to 5.3 percent for investment and 12 percent for
subsidies in the 1990 plan.12 This caused economic growth to slow and taxable activity to
decline. As state revenue failed to even finance its own consumption, “the Soviet system almost
ceased to function after 1988.” Thus, price subsidies had hurt the economy not only by adding to
budget expenditure, but also by indirectly decreasing revenue. The destabilization of the
consumer market and the rate of repressed inflation also accelerated, because the amount of
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money printed to cover the deficit soared after 1985. Buyng-Yeon Kim concludes, the “sharp
increase in printing money in the late 1980s suggests that the Soviet economy was then on the
verge of collapse.”13

Source: Kim, 121.

Inflation and Collapse
Inflation began to spiral out of control in the early 1990s as the government started
raising both prices and wages. The cause of the shortages to begin with was that consumer
purchasing power was higher than the supply of goods. In a market economy, rising demand
leads to price increases and a greater quantity of goods being sold. In the Soviet Union, prices
remained fixed for most of the post-war era, even as the population and their wages grew. This
should have led to price increases, but instead the inflation was repressed, so store shelves
remained empty, while workers‟ savings grew. Freeing prices would have allowed the consumer
market to balance, albeit by causing open inflation. The Soviet leaders knew that prices were too
low but felt that simply releasing controls would be politically dangerous. Their preferred
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approach was to raise prices by fiat rather than letting them be set by market pressures.
However, they felt that it was necessary to compensate for the increases by also raising wages
and pensions. This policy made good sense politically, but the results were economically
disastrous. Since both incomes and prices increased, there was no incentive for producers to
increase their output and shortages persisted. Moreover, price increases went into effect first,
while the compensation that was promised often took longer to arrive. This left many people
simultaneously facing shortages, inflation, and lower real incomes.14
Instead of alleviating the shortages, Gorbachev‟s policies made them intolerable. As
described previously, shortages were a result of central planning and were already a major
nuisance long before Gorbachev came to power and started tinkering with the system. The great
irony was that he correctly identified this problem, but his attempted solutions made it so much
worse. In 1989, the supply of consumer goods was no longer just growing slower than workers‟
incomes but actually lower than the previous year in absolute terms. Production of numerous
durable goods, including furniture and various home appliances, fell far short of the planned
goals. As domestic production fell, imports of consumer goods were also reduced by 9 billion
rubles between 1986 and 1988. By 1991, only twenty out of 1,100 categories of consumer goods
were “routinely available.” The most alarming new shortages reported were of soap, laundry
powder, and toothpaste.15
In the case of the food supply, the collective farms had always been inefficient, and much
of their product rotted before it made it to store shelves due to problems with collection, storage,
and transportation. This issue was exacerbated by perestroika. Soviet harvests relied largely on
the extra labor of urban workers and professionals being sent out from enterprises to help collect
the crop at the appropriate time. This practice was unpopular but necessary in the context of the
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Soviet system. After Gorbachev loosened the grip of central control, enterprises began refusing
to send their workers out to the fields, and the harvest suffered as a result. Agricultural
authorities then retaliated by refusing to send whatever crops they did collect to the cities that
failed to help with the harvest. This type of selfish behavior became part of a general pattern in
the Gorbachev era.16
As shortages worsened and the command hierarchy fell apart, the political and economic
components of the Soviet Union became antagonistic towards each other and ceased to function
effectively as a unit. From individuals to republics, everyone started trying to look out for their
own and hoarding whatever food, goods, and cash they could find. While shortages had always
existed, hoarding was a new development. Previously, people at least felt comfortable that a
minimum supply of food would always be there, even if the selection was poor or they had to
wait in line. With perestroika, they were no longer sure that stores would have food in the near
future, and if they did, the prices would probably be higher by then. People also hoarded
consumer goods, either to save for personal future use or in an effort to buy anything available
and resell it for profit.17
Public hoarding was even more extensive than hoarding by individuals. Republics,
cities, enterprises, and other groups tried to take care of their own constituents by turning to
protectionist policies, but this instead only exacerbated the situation for everyone. Enterprises
started refusing to fulfill contracts to deliver necessary inputs to others producers, which
obviously hampered their output. In 1989, the Moscow city government ordered stores to start
checking passports and only allow residents of Moscow or the surrounding oblast to purchase
food. In retaliation, surrounding cities stopped delivering supplies to Moscow and started using
their own rationing systems. Rationing spread to Leningrad and other cities across Russia in
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1990. Perhaps most damaging to the Soviet Union as a whole was the introduction of
protectionist policies by the member republics. In late 1990, Ukraine completely stopped
exporting agricultural products to Russia and started issuing coupons to its citizens so only they
could buy goods in Ukraine. The rest of the republics also started acting independently around
this time and contributed as little tax revenue and resources to the center as possible. Again, the
logic behind their policies is understandable, but the effect was to worsen the economic disaster.
Protectionism created a breakdown in trade, which only made shortages worse everywhere.
When the union government did not receive the expected revenue contributions from the
republics, its budget deficits grew much faster than they already had been. The deficits were
covered by simply printing more money, which became an immediate cause of hyperinflation. 18
In the early 1990s, the collapse became imminent. In 1990 and 1991, shortfalls in the
budget got much worse than they had even been in the late 1980s. Government revenue covered
only 36 percent of planned expenditure in the first quarter of 1991, leaving a gap of 27 billion
rubles that had to be financed by an increase in the money supply. Falling production and
increased spending on social welfare were responsible for much of the discrepancy. Gross
national product fell by 2 percent in 1990 and 13 percent in 1991. Foreign trade revenue also
declined, with 1991 exports falling by 33 percent and imports by 45 percent. Yet the biggest
problem came from the loss of control over the member republics, as they transferred only about
half of their agreed contributions to the central budget. It was unclear how high the deficits
actually got, but some estimated the deficits of 1990 and 1991 to be around 200 billion rubles.
The enormous deficits were monetized and total bank deposits were over 1.3 trillion rubles in
1991, despite only 157.6 billion in circulation. 19
The bloated money supply and the huge gap between supply and demand finally led to
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open inflation and widespread shortages. Official inflation was measured at 5.3 percent in 1990,
but the freely set prices on the farmers‟ markets showed inflation of 29 percent. Despite barely
raising official prices, the Soviet state apparently realized that its currency was rapidly losing
value, because ruble-to-dollar exchange rates increased at similar rates on the black market and
at state auctions. The ruble steadily depreciated throughout 1990, and by the end of the year,
black market prices were three to four times higher, on average, than official rates. On the first
day of 1991, some prices were finally raised or even liberalized, but many remained fixed or
regulated. Open inflation reached about 20 percent in 1990 and 200 percent by 1991. Yet,
despite the price rises, shortages actually got worse in 1991 than they were in 1990. This
occurred because the increases were not sufficient to balance supply and demand, but they did
unleash the repressed inflation that been building for decades. In addition, the level of supply
dropped as enterprises reduced output and fewer imports came in. 20
Table 12. Inflation in the Soviet Union or Russian Federation, 1985-1995
Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995

Official Figure
(percent)
1.0
2.0
1.3
0.6
2.0
5.3
96.3
-

Highest Estimate
(percent)
4.6
6
8
20
200
2318
841
205
131

Sources: Shleifer and Vishny, 344; Filatochev and Bradshaw, 739;
Fischer and Frenkel, 39; Hedlund and Sundström, 893.

As repressed inflation became open and shortages worsened, the Soviet economy almost
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ceased to function. Real income decreased due to the falling value of the ruble, but buying
necessities depended more on finding them rather than affording them. According to one
estimate, “30 million man-years [were] spent in queues annually—about 25 percent of the
waking time of every adult.”21 Consumers had more incentive to look for goods than to work
more, so aggregate labor supply decreased. Money lost its function as a store of value, so
consumers began hoarding durables and dollars, while firms hoarded their inputs instead of
producing. The latter phenomenon was particularly damaging to the economy, because it led to a
drop in output and further shortages. Because many prices remained fixed, many producers
chose to not honor their contracts with state enterprises and instead sold their output to higherpaying customers. In the absence of a properly functioning currency, bartering and theft also
developed. Shleifer and Vishny concluded that “the collapse of the Soviet economy is at least in
part explained buy the breakdown of traditional coordination channels and the resulting diversion
of labor and inputs.”22
As the Soviet Union disintegrated, inflation became a regional issue, and the former
republics had to deal with their own economic problems. They had to establish their own
functioning governments to replace the central control from Moscow. The Central Bank of the
USSR dissolved, and the individual republics became responsible for issuing rubles. Anders
Åslund argues that one of the main causes of the hyperinflation was maintaining the ruble zone
for a year and a half too long. By late 1990, the Soviet Union had ceased to function because the
member republics stopped contributing to the central budget. Instead, the former republics were
each left with their own deficits, which they all financed with by issuing rubles from their own
central banks. This led to even faster inflation due to different banks issuing the same currency
without any coordination. In 1992, several of the successor states began issuing their own paper
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moneys, usually known as coupons, to get away from the depreciating ruble. 23 However, these
coupons suffered from their own hyperinflations soon after being issued and were eventually
replaced by other national currencies. *
On January 2nd, 1992, Russia finally liberalized most prices, with only a few controls
remaining. Resulting price increases were very large that month, 382 percent for producers and
296 for consumers, largely due to all the existing monetary overhang and inflationary
expectations. In other words, people expected prices to go up as soon as they were freed and
rushed to spend the money that had been printed and languished in bank accounts unspent. This
caused velocity to go up, and inflation continued at a rapid pace, reaching a staggering 2,318
percent by the end of the year. The macroeconomic effect of inflation was a shortening of the
time horizon for economic decision making. With money losing its value so quickly, people
were reluctant to make long-term contracts, and investment in the Russian economy fell by more
than 60 percent from 1992 to 1994.24
Discussion

The situation got so bad because Soviet authorities refused to recognize and properly deal
with the problem of repressed inflation earlier. Decades before the collapse, both Western and
Soviet economists realized that the Soviet economy was not immune to inflation. In 1985, Igor
Birman and Roger A. Clarke wrote that the problem of the money supply was getting worse in
the Soviet Union and needed to be dealt with eventually. They suggested four ideas that could
have potentially fixed the issue: “(1) A drastic cut in military expenditure” would have freed up

*

According to one family anecdote, people in Ukraine were trading a kilogram of coupo ns for a kilogram of bread
in the early 1990s. Issues of Ekonomika i Zhizn’ from 1992 have stories of people using suitcases to carry cash and
political cartoons depicting absurdly large bags used as wallets, so there may be some truth to such stories.
(Ekonomika i Zhizn, No. 7, p. 3; No. 10, p. 9; No. 21, p. 2).
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resources to produce consumer goods but was unlikely. “(2) A radical economic reform in
industry and/or agriculture” could have increased economic performance, but was not a solution
as long as the population had no reason to earn more money. “(3) A sharp increase in retail
prices” certainly could have restored equilibrium between supply and demand, but would have
caused “severe discontent” unless done very carefully “with compensating wage increases.”
Finally, “(4) some kind of monetary reform designed to destroy most of the accumulated
savings” could have eliminated the overhang without causing inflation, but would have been
difficult to explain politically.25
During the reform debates of the late 1980s, Gorbachev was willing to listen to any
viewpoints, “as long as they were socialist.”26 He considered a limited private sector to be
desirable, but was very reluctant to accept any form of radical marketization. Many reformers
accepted the idea of decontrolling prices, but the greater question of creating market institutions
that allow supply and demand to function remained unanswered. To judge Gorbachev by Birman
and Clarke‟s four ideas, he attempted the first three inadequately and did not try the fourth.
Military spending was cut by 1.5 percent of the GDP, but this did not alleviate shortages on the
consumer market. Enterprises were partially liberalized, but as described earlier, this added more
to the money supply than to production. Prices and wages were finally raised in the early 1990s,
but again, the increases released inflation without being sufficient to balance supply and demand.
Valentin Pavlov, the last Soviet prime minister attempted a monetary confiscation in early 1991,
but it was vastly inadequate. Gorbachev cannot be blamed for creating disequilibrium and
repressed inflation in the Soviet economy, but his reforms made the problems that he inherited
worse instead of better.27
Economists differ about whether the Soviet Union should have reformed gradually or
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quickly in the early 1990s. In 1990, Gur Ofer argued against a quick, “big bang” approach.
Because liberalizing prices and marketizing the economy would certainly lead to open inflation,
he suggested that prices should be revised and the budget deficit reduced first. The Soviet Union
also lacked the proper institutions and infrastructure for a functioning market economy. Thus,
rapid marketization would lead not only to high inflation, but enterprises would also fail to
operate under market conditions. Ofer‟s theory was that stabilization should come before market
reforms. The primary step necessary to balance the budget would have been to eliminate price
subsidies and devalue the ruble, along with confiscating existing real balances and reducing real
incomes. However, Ofer realized that a price revision would have certainly been difficult. The
idea would have been “widely resisted on political and social grounds” and would have
“impose[d] an immediate and sizeable burden on most of the population.”

28

Given the circumstances in late 1991, Anders Åslund argues that a rapid transformation
was the best option. According to Åslund, it is politically easier to pass a large package of
reforms all at once, while it is clear that there is a crisis that needs to be fixed. He also suggests
that a “comprehensive and consistent” reform package is more effective. In Russia, it was
necessary to break inflationary expectations and force the rent-seeking managerial elite to
respond to market forces, namely consumer demand. This could only occur if “a strict budgetary
and monetary policy” were quickly implemented. In sum, the more rapid and radical the market
reforms, the sooner the distortions and corruption of the old system would be eliminated. 29 He
also rejects the notion that the Soviet Union dissolved too quickly, arguing that maintaining the
ruble zone a year and a half too long led to hyperinflation. 30
After the Soviet Union finally fell, triple-digit inflation was running rampant and the
population was near starvation, so authorities had to act quickly. 31 Economists do agree that the
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government should have reduced its deficit and the monetary overhang before liberalizi ng
prices.32 However, Fischer and Frenkel assert that this choice was not available in 1992. The
Russian budget deficit stood at 20 percent of GNP, and it had no “external resources [available]
to help finance the budget and stabilize the currency.” In that circumstance, “the choice was
between (a) liberalizing prices and risking hyperinflation and (b) maintaining price controls with
the consequence of growing shortages.” A growing number of transactions were occurring on
the black market anyway, so the choice was essentially between hidden and open inflation. With
no time for gradual reform due to the rapidly collapsing system, policymakers chose to go with
“shock treatment” or the “Big Bang” approach. The transition to a market economy was
expected to be painful, so the point of shock therapy was the get the pain over quickly. 33
Hedlund and Sundström instead suggest that currency reform was possible and should
have been enacted. A majority of the overhang was due to money that was printed in 1991.
According to these two authors, the printing presses created more money in that year alone than
in the previous 30 years, 137.8 billion in 1991 compared to 133.8 billion from 1961-1990. They
blame Yeltsin for promising substantial benefits to the population, in the midst of his power
struggle with Gorbachev, with no way to pay his promises other than money creation. Yeltsin‟s
camp moved to control the Russian central bank, which financed the Russian Federation‟s 1991
budget deficit that was equivalent to a ridiculous 31.9 percent of its GDP. The overhang created
by this expansion in the money supply could have been eliminated by currency reform. Hedlund
and Sundström agree with Ofer that currency reform would have been politically difficult, but
suggest that it was possible in the context of shock therapy, rather than gradual reform. Not only
would it have made economic sense, but could have also been done in politically palatable way
“by introducing graduated rights for the changing of old rubles into new currency.” They find it
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strange that Russia did so little counteract inflation.34 This counters Fischer and Frenkel‟s idea
that the authorities had no choice but to let hyperinflation happen. 35
Stabilization
High inflation continued in Russia until 1995, as several attempts to stabilize the ruble
failed. The first attempt was in early 1992, when Egor Gaidar instituted his shock therapy
reforms, rapidly privatizing the economy and cutting the budget deficit. Thus, monetization of
deficits became less of a factor in causing inflation. However, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR)
continued far more to the money supply by granting credits to commercial banks. These credits
totaled 457 billion rubles in just the first half of 1992, which was almost equivalent to the
monetary base at the beginning of the year. Viktor Gerashchenko, the former head of the Soviet
State Bank, became head of the CBR in July 1992 and continued granting credits to agriculture,
industry, and the budgets of Russia and the former Soviet republics. After a decline from the
peak in January, inflation began rising against after July. In mid-1993, finance minister Boris
Fyodorov negotiated an agreement with the CBR to limit how much credit it granted, but the
central bank broke the agreement and continued granting excessive credit due to lobbying
pressure. This lead to another increase in the inflation rate in January 1994. This situation
repeated itself again in a third stabilization attempt in 1994, in which credit was temporarily
tightened, then expanded again.36
The ruble was finally stabilized in 1995 when the Russian government and the CBR
found a way to bring profits to commercial banks without creating inflation. Throughout the first
half of the 1990s, commercial banks and enterprises profited from inflation and lobbied the
government and the central bank to keep credit rolling. As Austrian economist Murray Rothbard
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has argued, those who receive newly printed money first see the most benefit because they use it
before it inflates. People who receive the money last have the most to lose, because it has lost its
value by the time it gets to them. Thus, Russian commercial banks were able to receive credit at
low or negative real interest rates. In return, the banks funded the election campaigns of Russian
politicians, or conversely, threatened to slow down the economy if their credits stopped. In May
1993, the Finance Ministry started offering short term government securities (GKOs) with rates
that were significantly higher than inflation, and the profits off GKOs were tax free. After late
1994, banks started investing more heavily in GKOs and were able to make profits that
compensated for what they lost from the curtailment of central bank credit. Since the banks were
now lending to the state at fixed interest rates, inflation was no longer in their self-interest.
Finally, the government also made a deal with crucial enterprises, especially in the energy sector,
which had also been recipients of credit. The fuel and electricity sectors agreed to continue
supplying their products without requiring additional payment from the budget in exchange for
toleration of their past and present tax arrears. 37
With the pro-inflation lobby happy and paid-off, the Russian government and central
bank were able to make several changes to ensure that inflation remained low. Reserve
requirements for commercial banks were more than double from January to August of 1995.
Real interest rates went up to 35 percent in 1995, and as explained, central bank credits to private
banks and enterprises significantly decreased. The central bank also stopped granting credit to
the government for its budget deficits. Instead, the sale of the new securities and foreign
borrowing helped to pay for the deficit and reducing the need to new money creation. The
government almost managed to reduce the deficit overall, down to manageable 2.9 percent of
GDP in 1995. Stabilization did not lead to a noticeable increase in unemployment, which
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remained around 9 percent. The decline in GDP, which had been in double digits from 1992 to
1994, improved to negative 4 percent in 1995 and 1996, before eking into positive territory in
1997.38

Source: Daniel S. Treisman, “Fighting Inflation in a Transitional Regime: Russia‟s Anomalous
Stabilization,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jan., 1998): 243.

Social Effects
Inflation led to a precipitous drop in living standards in the early 1990s. Nominal
incomes went up as they chased after rising prices but only compensated for about 80 percent of
the increased costs. In other words, inflation caused real incomes to decrease by around 20
percent. The existence of poverty was never acknowledged in the Soviet Union before
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Gorbachev‟s time and remained difficult to estimate. By the most reasonable consensus, it
appears that about one-third of the Soviet population, or almost 100 million people, was below
the poverty line in 1991. The drop in standard of living was worse in some regions than others.
The largest cities, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, had the highest inflation rates and resulting
decreases in real incomes: 31 percent in Moscow, 24 percent in Kiev, and 20 percent in St.
Petersburg. The Central Asian republics were also hit harder by inflation than the Slavic ones.
Large families, which were mostly in Central Asia, found it very difficult to feed all of their
children in the wake of rising prices and very meager state assistance. In the three main Slavic
republics, eleven percent or less lived below the poverty line, compared to a staggering half or
more of the people in Central Asia. 39
Inflation also disproportionally hurt some groups, such as women and the elderly, and
wiped out everyone‟s life savings, while the rich were only ones to benefit. Even before the
collapse, most women earned far lower salaries than men, and the further reduction in real
incomes made life even harder for time. Retirees relied on fixed monthly pensions that lagged
even further behind inflation than workers‟ incomes, and worse still, the checks were not
delivered at all for months at a time during the crisis. Hyperinflation also destroyed life savings
on which workers and retirees hoped they could depend. For example, one college-educated
woman had earned a monthly salary of 120 rubles and saved 10 rubles a month for many years to
amass 3000 rubles in savings by the early 1990s. Hyperinflation made this considerable sum
worth the equivalent of 3 rubles.†40 Those who benefited from inflation were the “„new
Russians‟, i.e. people who operate at or beyond the outer limits of law and common decency.”41
Average real wages for most groups fell four years in a row, from 1992 to 1995. However, the

†

This was made official in 1998, when the ruble was revalued at a ratio of 1000 to 1.
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richest 20 percent were the only group to increase their incomes, showing growing inequality.
Average Russians now resent the newly rich oligarchs as thieves who gained their wealth by
stealing from state enterprises.42
Perestroika and inflation also led to “the first sustained food crisis since World War II."43
This was nothing approaching another famine, but food became more expensive and difficult to
find, and the quality of diets dropped. Large cities and the Central Asian republics were also hit
harder by food shortages. The cities relied on deliveries from the provinces, which stopped
showing up due to the separatism and hoarding described earlier. In 1989, Moscow already
reported that many stores had no meat at all, and most other foods were also in shortage. Per
capita consumption of potatoes, fruits, and vegetables was lower in Moscow in 1985 than it was
1980, and dropped even lower in 1989. Citizens of Leningrad were particularly troubled by the
new food shortages, as they remembered the million deaths from starvation during the Second
World War. Due to rising inflation, the percentage of household incomes spent on food
increased by 6 percent in 1991 over 1990, yet the quantity and quality of the food available both
declined. The overall daily caloric ration dropped by 10 percent, largely because consumption of
meat, milk, butter, and eggs fell even farther. People were forced to compensate by eating more
carbohydrates, such as bread, potatoes, and sugar. Worse still, the citizens of Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan ate less of not just animal products but even the starchy foods. The
food crisis had damaging effects on the health of Soviet citizens and may have been responsible
for the falling birth rate and rising death rate in 1991. 44
As shown in the following chart, food production in Russia continued to drop
precipitously after 1991. Although overall caloric intake stabilized after 1992, due to increased
imports and production from private gardens, Russians have a number of complaints about the
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post-Soviet food supply. At the height of the inflationary crisis, huge crowds gathered to
purchase any type of meat being offered, and people had to grab whatever they could before
being shoved out of the way. Throughout the 1990s, Russians continued to get less of their daily
Table 13. Food Production in Russia per Year Compared to Previous Years, 1991-1995
Food category
(in tons, unless
otherwise noted)
Total food
production
Meat (mil.)
Sausage products
(mil.)
Milk products
(mil.)
Animal fats (thou.)
Cheese (thou.)
Fish and fish
products (mil.)
Margarine (thou.)
Vegetable oil
(thou.)
Sugar (mil.)
Bread and bakery
products (mil.)
Confectionary
products (mil.)
Flour (mil.)
Groats (mil.)
Macaroni products
(thou.)
Preserves (mil.
cans)
Alcohol (mil.
decaliters)

1991

1991 as
a % of
1990

1992

1992 as
a % of
1991

1994 as
a % of
1993

1995

1995 as 1995 as
a % of a % of
1994
1991

-

91

-

85

-

-

-

5.6

84

4.4

76

75

2.5

76

44.6

2.1

91

1.5

73

102

1.27

82

60.5

18.5

89

9.5

51

83

5.4

76

29.2

724
394

87
86

746
295

103
75

67
89

419
217

86
76

57.9
55.1

3.8

89

3.1

83

78

1.6

108

42.1

627

78

560

89

-

-

-

1149

99.2

954

82

76

773

85

67.3

3.1

87

3.9

114

69

3.1

115

100

19

104

16.9

89

82

10.9

88

57.4

2.6

92

1.8

69

-

-

-

20.7
2.7

99.8
93

19.9
1.9

97
71

87
71

14
1.4

88
90

113

107

1.1

99

-

-

-

7.0

85

5.3

77

-

-

-

82.2

104

76.3

92

78

122

98

67.6
51.2

117

Note: The economic facts published for 1993 did not include detailed food production statistics but did
note that purchases of meat products, sugar, and vegetable oil grew from 12 to 26 percent, and purchases
of milk products by 6 percent, as the population adapted to “unorganized” food trade. Production
statistics for 1994 also unavailable.
Source: Ekonomika i Zhizn’ (1992, no. 4; 1993, no. 4; 1994, no. 8; 1996, no. 6).
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caloric intake from meat and milk products and more from starchy foods such as bread and
potatoes. According to conventional dietary advice, this has actually been good for their health,
since animal fats are blamed for cardiovascular diseases. However, iron deficiencies, diabetes,
and obesity are also cited as some of the main nutrition- linked health problems in Russia. Iron
is most readily available in red meat and other animal sources, a lack of which in the diet can
lead to an iron deficiency. A growing number of nutrition experts also caution against excessive
carbohydrate intake and blame high incidences of obesity and diabetes on the consumption of too
many sugary and starchy foods. Perhaps the most serious dietary imbalance in the 1990s was
that only 3 or 4 percent of Russian caloric intake came from fruits and vegetables, which all
health experts would agree is far too low. Now, there is a wide variety of meats and produce
offered in stores, but Russians complain that most of it comes from far away and has numerous
additives that were not used in Soviet times. 45
Political Effects
As the problems of the Soviet Union became readily apparent to its population, they
became angry but were not sure whom or what to blame. Initially, it seemed like the problem
was communism, which never lived up to its promise and could not match the prosperity of the
capitalist West. By its last few years, very few people in the Soviet Union cared about
Marxism-Leninism.46 However, when Gorbachev started chipping away at central planning, the
economy suddenly became much worse than it had been for the previous several decades. If
nothing else, the post-war Soviet economy was stable, and it managed to consistently provide a
minimum of comfort. Perestroika took away even this guaranteed minimum. When prices
remained steady, there were always shortages, but when the prices started to rise, shortages got
worse and everything became harder to afford. Many blamed Gorbachev and the central
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government for the general failure of the economy, but shop managers who raised prices were
also treated with hostility. According to William Moskoff, inflation hurt the Soviet people‟s
confidence in economic freedom.47 After all, Gorbachev had allowed them some freedoms, and
the result was economic collapse and widespread misery for most people. This made the Soviet
population ambivalent about whether communism or capitalism was the right answer.
Communism gave them shortages, but when it ended, conditions somehow became even worse.
Poll results from the early 1990s show that support for democratic capitalism in the
Eastern Bloc varied depending on whom respondents blamed for the economic chaos. Raymond
Duch conducted a survey of the European USSR in 1990 and found that economic hardship did
not inspire the Soviet people to instantly reject democracy and capitalism, because they still
blamed the failing economy on communist rule. Far more Soviets supported democratic and
free market principles than authoritarian and communist ones. The author also studied poll data
from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, which showed slightly different results. As time
passed and democratic capitalism became more established, people began to associate it with the
continuing economic problems, although they were still not ready to abandon it.48
Powers and Cox did a similar study based on Polish polling data from 1993. They
discovered that economic hardship did not necessarily drive Polish voters back towards
communism. Of greater importance was whether they considered the communist system or the
first-wave of free market reformers responsible for the economy‟s problems the decline in living
standards. On a scale of 1 to 5, respondents assigned slightly higher blame to the communist
system than the first-wave reformers, a mean of 3.1 for the former and 3.6 for the latter. As
shown in the chart below, the largest percentage believed that the reformers were mostly to
blame and not the communist system. However, the second largest number responded that both
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deserved blame, and third largest considered communism mostly responsible. Nevertheless, the
most leftist party, Alliance of the Democratic Left, performed the best in the 1993 Polish
election, and two of the next three runners-up also leaned towards the left.49
Table 14. Relationship between Blame of the Communist System
and Blame of First-Wave Reformers in Poland
First-Wave Blame
Low Medium High
Communist system blame
Low
6.0%
Medium
1.0%
High
18.5%

1.5%
6.9%
2.1%

34.3%
3.0%
26.8%

Note: High blame = responses of 4 or 5; low blame of 1 or 2.
Source: Powers and Cox, 619.

According to a 1991 survey by the Pew Research Center, a majority of respondents in
each of nine former Soviet bloc countries polled approved of the transition to democracy and
capitalism. However, the degree to which people accepted communism‟s demise varied greatly
by country. The Eastern bloc republics, which were nominally independent but actually
controlled by Russia, had the largest majorities in favor of moving towards free markets and
democracy. These countries only became part of the Soviet sphere of influence after the Second
World War and had communism forced upon them at that time. As a result, they were not as
accustomed or attached to the Soviet system and in fact tended to resent Russia‟s dominance
over them. This is evidenced by the intermittent worker rebellions in these countries and their
rapid exits from the Bloc as soon as they realized Gorbachev would not use force to stop them. ‡
Ukrainians had also seen the worst of Soviet tyranny under Stalin and welcomed democracy as

‡

“The 40,000 aristocrats and fascists of the Csepel Works strike on.” – A sarcastic poster from the Hungarian
workers’ revolt of 1956 that illustrates the irony of official communist propaganda labeling dissatisfied members of
the proletariat right-wing or bourgeois.
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much or more than some of the Eastern Bloc nations. As the leading ethnic group of the Soviet
Union, Russians were the least unsatisfied with the existing political order, although a majority
of 61 percent still favored democracy. However, Russia and Ukraine, the most populous former
Soviet republics, were both almost evenly split on whether they wanted capitalism. Thus, it
seems that Soviet citizens were frustrated with communism but unsure if capitalism was the right
answer.50
Table 15. Approval of Change to Democracy
(in percent)
Country
East Germany
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Poland
Hungary
Lithuania
Russia
Bulgaria
Ukraine

1991
91
80
70
66
74
75
61
76
72

2009
85
80
71
70
56
55
53
52
30

Table 16. Approval of Change to Capitalism
(in percent)

Change
-6
0
+1
+4
-18
-20
-8
-24
-42

Country
East Germany
Czech Republic
Poland
Slovakia
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Russia
Hungary
Ukraine

1991
86
87
80
69
73
76
54
80
52

2009
82
79
71
66
53
50
50
46
36

Change
-4
-8
-9
-3
-20
-26
-4
-34
-16

Source: Pew Research Center.

Pew also conducted another survey asking the same questions in 2009, the results of
which are likely to be the ones more surprising to Western readers. East Germany, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Poland have held firm in their support for both capitalism and
democracy. However, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine have all seen significant drops
in public support for the twin systems of liberal society in the last twenty years. Opinions in the
first three of these countries are split fairly evenly on whether the transition was desirable, while
a large majority of Ukrainians now disapprove of the change on both accounts. As for Russia, its
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levels of support for liberal social systems were among the very bottom originally, but they have
not fallen nearly as far as in the other countries in this second group. 51
These declines in support for liberalism come despite the fact that respondents in every
country reported higher life satisfaction in 2009 than in 1991, often significantly so. As one
might expect, the countries with the lowest life satisfaction have large majorities that feel that
people are worse off now than they were under communism. However, the other seven countries
polled also have significant pluralities that feel the same way. Another interesting caveat to this
data is that responses vary greatly by age group. In every country but Ukraine, a majority of
respondents ages 18-29 continue to favor democracy and capitalism, but this support consistently
decreases as age increases. Life satisfaction similarly decreases with age. 52
Table 17. Percent Satisfied with Life

Table 18. People Worse Off Than
Under Communis m? (in percent)

Country

1991

2009

Change

Country

Worse

Poland
Slovakia
Russia
Czech Republic
Lithuania
Ukraine
Bulgaria
Hungary
Germany
East
West

12
13
7
23
13
8
7
8
44
15
53

44
43
35
49
35
26
15
15
47
43
48

+32
+30
+28
+26
+22
+18
+11
+7
+3
+28
-4

Hungary
Ukraine
Bulgaria
Lithuania
Slovakia
Russia
Czech Rep.
Poland

72
62
48
48
48
45
39
35

About
the same
16
13
15
15
18
15
12
12

Better
8
12
23
23
29
33
45
47

Source: Pew Research Center.

According to interviews conducted by the author, the chaos and poverty of perestroika
and inflation discredited democracy and capitalism in the eyes of many Russians. Although the
standard of living under communism was far lower under communism than in the West,
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conditions were stable and virtually unchanging, so people grew accustomed to them. Even in
the 1980s, people in Russia lacked items which are considered essential in the West, such as
telephones and toilet paper, yet none of the people interviewed reported feeling especially
deprived. Although the selection of food and goods was bland or inadequate, the necessary
minimum was always available. During the Gorbachev years, they heard that living standards
were much better in the West and hoped that freeing the economy would bring the same to them.
However, these hopes were soon met with disappointment. In contrast to the communist days,
perestroika and hyperinflation stood out in the interviewees‟ memories as catastrophic
disturbances that made their lives worse than they had always been before. In general, most
Russians today do not want to go back to communism, but they do favor a state-guided
economy.53
Despite some electoral irregularities, the presidencies of Vladimir Putin and his
counterpart Dmitry Medvedev generally reflect the political preferences of Russia‟s citizens.
After the shock therapy reforms and relatively free democratic competition of the 1990s, Putin
has been gradually steering Russia away from both capitalism and democracy. In an interview
from 2006, Putin spoke about the need to additional state intervention in the economy, such as
state investment, subsidies, price regulations, protectionist tariffs, etc. While some of this
rhetoric echoed the Soviet days, Putin and Medvedev‟s recent policies are more akin to state
capitalism. With allegations of voter fraud and poisoning of opposition leaders frequently in the
news, Putin‟s lack of commitment to democracy is perhaps to well-known in the West to require
much elaboration. In short, Russia‟s legislature is very weak, the president is very powerful, and
corruption is widespread. An international rating agency, Freedom House, has downgraded
Russia‟s score on civil and political rights continuously since 1997. 54
87

Opposition to Putin is relatively weak and not entirely committed to democracy and
capitalism either. Since the Soviet Union fell, the largest opposition party in Russia has been the
reformed Communist Party, but it has never been able to regain power through the ballot box.
Numerous other opposition parties have formed over the past twenty years, but none have had
any considerable electoral success. Most of these parties have been based around particular
leaders, which has made it easier for those in power to deal with political threats as individuals,
rather than institutions. Some of these parties have merged with Putin‟s party, United Russia,
while others have faded from significance. The only other party which has consistently remained
a somewhat of a force in post-Soviet Russia is the misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of
Vladimir Zhirinovsky. More accurately, Zhirinovsky‟s views can be described as far-right,
nationalist, racist, or imperialist. If there were any danger of the Russian hyperinflation leading
to a similar result as in the Weimar Republic, it would be with Zhirinovsky. However, his party
hit a peak with 22.8 percent in the 1993 Duma elections and has been unable to improve its
results since.55
Table 19. Russian Presidential Elections, 2000-2012
United Russia
(Putin/Medvedev)
Communist Party
(Zyuganov/Kharitonov)
Liberal Democratic
(Zhirinovsky/Malyshkin)
Others

2000

2004

2008

2012

53.4

71.3

71.2

63.6

29.5

13.7

18

17.2

2.7

2.0

9.5

6.2

14.4

13

1.3

11.79

Source: Åslund, 208, 245.
Most Russians have shown no interest in experimenting with any new ideologies and
seen content to elect establishment-picked successors. Although Boris Yeltsin had become very
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unpopular by the late 1990s, his chosen heir, Putin, has been in power ever since. When Putin
switched offices with Medvedev to appease constitutional technicality, Russian voters went
along with the façade. After months of intrigue of whether Medvedev or Putin would run in
2012, Putin rather unsurprisingly became President again. His winning percentage fell to 63.6
percent, down from a peak of 71.3 percent in 2004, but still much higher than his total of 53.4
percent from the year 2000. More importantly, Putin‟s share of the vote in 2012 was over three
times higher than his closest opponent from the Communist Party, and the other candidates were
mired in the single digits. Thus, even if there is some degree of voter fraud in Russia, it appears
that a genuine majority of Russians is willing to follow Putin down the road to moderate
authoritarianism.56
Conclusion
Partly due to the trauma of perestroika and hyperinflation, many people in former
communist countries have come to view the transition to democracy and capitalism unfavorably.
However, when the transition was in progress, larger majorities saw it as necessary. Consumers
had grown tired of constant shortages of most goods and hoped that capitalism and democracy
would improve their lives. Instead, the economy got worse under Gorbachev, as his reforms
failed to increase productivity or supply of consumer goods, but did increase budget deficits.
When the Soviet Union completely collapse and Russia moved ahead with full-fledged
democracy and capitalist shock therapy, the first result was hyperinflation. The collapse of the
ruble benefitted only a small number of well-connected or corrupt “new Russians,” while the rest
of the population suffered. Shortages actually became worse initially, life savings and monthly
pensions became worthless, and the quality of diets drastically declined. These traumatic
experiences have tempered the enthusiasm of many for capitalism and democracy, especially the
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elderly, who suffered more than most. In many former communist countries, citizens have been
willing to accept a return to authoritarianism in both politics and economics for the sake of
stability and some insurance of material comfort. 57
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Since the inception of the Soviet Union until its collapse and beyond, inflation and price
controls have influenced Russian living standards and politics. Inflation and food shortages
helped bring down the Russian imperial and provisional governments, which paved the way for
the Bolsheviks. However, the first few years of Bolshevik rule led to hyperinflation, outright
famine, and growing rebellions. In order to consolidate their political power, the Bolsheviks
realized that they needed to control inflation. They successfully stabilized the ruble in the 1920s
with conventional fiscal conservatism, but inflation began to rise again after Stalin took over and
the economy was collectivized. Stalin instituted a widespread system of price controls that lasted
until the end of the Soviet period. After grappling with inflation before and during the Second
World War, the Soviet government managed to stop growing prices with a currency reform in
1947.
In the post-war era, Soviet planners effectively managed to keep prices under control.
However, inflationary pressure could not be completely eliminated by simply fixing prices.
After the 1960s, workers‟ wages continued to grow faster than the prices of goods. In a market
economy, prices act as a signal to tell producers what to produce and how much. In the Soviet
economy, planners decided what to produce and how much it should cost. Since they never
adequately increased either the prices or the supply of food and consumer goods, the result was
constant shortages. Shortages lasted as long as the Soviet Union did and created very low living
standards in comparison to the West. Incomes continued to fall further behind, while many food
products and goods that were ubiquitous in the West were almost unavailable in the Soviet
Union.
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Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, hoped to solve the problems that had been
plaguing the Soviet economy for decades, but instead, his efforts made the existing problems
worse and created new ones. Gorbachev‟s reforms, known as perestroika, allowed just enough
freedom to initiate the collapse of the Soviet command system, but not enough to create a
functioning market economy. The constituent parts of the Soviet Union ceased to function
together as a unit and started taking short-sighted actions to try to help themselves which actually
hurt the entire economy. In addition, the government started running large budget deficits under
Gorbachev and paying for them by simply printing money. In short, Gorbachev‟s policies led to
the collapse of the Soviet Union, even greater shortages, and Russia‟s second hyperinflation.
However, the hyperinflation started when prices were freed, just after the Soviet Union ended, so
many people associated the chaos of the 1990s with free markets and democracy. As a result,
most Russians today are skeptical of full-fledged capitalism and believe that a state-guided
economy is necessary to ensure stability.
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